Skip to main content

An Invisible Hand Theorem for Collectivists

  • Chapter
Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy ((SEEP))

  • 269 Accesses

Abstract

Although cloistered away for almost two decades now, out of communication with almost all of my old friends, I find no difficulty in recalling the lively, penetrating, and unique mind of Jim Buchanan. What most distinguished Jim to me was his appreciation for sensible novelty. The Jim I remember was quick to recognize the oppressive power of intellectual tradition and rebelled against it whenever it became clear that the tradition posed a substantial barrier to a rational understanding of the world around us. Along with this basic iconoclasm came an unusual appreciation for seeing old things in a new light. No matter how much an idea grated against his basic instincts, he appreciated an idea if it amounted to a logical and empirically meaningful attack on a traditional belief.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Apostol, T.M.: Mathematical Analysis, Reading MA (Addison Wesley) 1957. Berge, C.: Topological Spaces, Including a Treatment of Multi-valued Functions, Vector Spaces and Convexity, Edinburgh (Oliver and Boyd) 1963.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackorby, C., D. Nissen, D. Primont, And R.R. Russell: “Consistent Intertemporal Decision Making,” Review of Economic Studies, Apr. 1972, pp. 239–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, James M.: Freedom in Constitutional Conact: Perspectives of a Political Economist, College Station, TX and London (Texas A and M University Press) 1977, pp. 4–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, S.M.: “Consistent Plans,” Review of Economic Studies, 148 (Apr. 1980), pp. 533–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hammond, P.J.: “Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice”, Review of Economic Studies, 133 (Feb. 1976), pp. 159–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marschak, J. And Radner, R.: Economic Theory of Teams, New Haven (Yale University Press) 1972.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nikaido, H.: Convex Structure and Economic Theory, New York (Academic Press) 1968.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peleg, B., AND M.E. Yaaiu: “On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action

    Google Scholar 

  • When Tastes are Changing“, Review of Economic Studies,July 1973, pp. 391–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollak, R.A.: “Consistent Planning”, Review of Economic Studies, 102 (Apr. 1968), pp. 202–08.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strotz, R.H.: “Myopia and Inconsistency Under Dynamic Utility Maximization”, Review of Economic Studies, 23 (1956), pp. 165–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thaler, R.H., AND H.M. Shefron: “An Economic Theory of Self Control”, Journal of Political Economy, 89 (Apr. 1981), pp. 392–406.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, E.A., AND R.L. Faith: “A Pure Theory of Strategic Behavior and Social Institutions”, American Economic Review, 71 (June 1981), pp. 366–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Neumann, J., And O. Morgenstern: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 3rd ed., Princeton (Princeton University Press) 1953.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Thompson, E.A. (2002). An Invisible Hand Theorem for Collectivists. In: Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_18

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07551-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-04810-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics