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An Invisible Hand Theorem for Collectivists

  • Earl A. Thompson
Part of the Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy book series (SEEP)

Abstract

Although cloistered away for almost two decades now, out of communication with almost all of my old friends, I find no difficulty in recalling the lively, penetrating, and unique mind of Jim Buchanan. What most distinguished Jim to me was his appreciation for sensible novelty. The Jim I remember was quick to recognize the oppressive power of intellectual tradition and rebelled against it whenever it became clear that the tradition posed a substantial barrier to a rational understanding of the world around us. Along with this basic iconoclasm came an unusual appreciation for seeing old things in a new light. No matter how much an idea grated against his basic instincts, he appreciated an idea if it amounted to a logical and empirically meaningful attack on a traditional belief.

Keywords

Reaction Function Perfect Information Prior Mover Optimality Theorem Perfect Information Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Earl A. Thompson

There are no affiliations available

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