Abstract
Starting from the two-stage model underlying constitutional political economy, this work suggests the introduction of a third stage with the aim of solving the problems, which under certain conditions arise in the public goods market. These problems may be due to: a) a centralized institutional framework, and b) the impossibility to reach an agreement following the majority rule.
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Eusepi, G. (2002). The Calculus of Dissent: Constitutional Completion and Public Goods. In: Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_16
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