Abstract
Since its initial developments in the 60’s, the intellectual contributions of James Buchanan have influenced the research of scholars working in the field of politics and economics. On his eightieth birthday we want to contribute to the Buchanan festschrift with this paper. In it, we develop a model of social interaction among individuals in the political market. We depart from the standard economic hypothesis by assuming a bounded individual rationality. The evolutionary character of the model is based on the process by which individuals take their political decisions: it tries to link decisions and outcomes through a learning process. To this extent we use concepts from the cognitive sciences and try to apply them, with varying degrees of success, to public choice.
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Casas-Pardo, J., Montoro-Pons, J.D., Puchades-Navarro, M. (2002). Evolution and Learning in Collective Decision Making. In: Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_14
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