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Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy ((SEEP))

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Abstract

While visiting the Center for Study of Public Choice in April 1994 I was allowed to attend, as an observer, sessions of a seminar constructed as a meeting of co-authors of James Buchanan. At the end of one session, Jim was asked to reflect on the role of co-authorship. In responding, Jim identified a number of patterns of co-authorship — ranging from long-running collaboration to a one-off paper in one dimension; and from genuine joint-production in which each author contributes to and learns from the partnership, to a more asymmetric senior/junior structure in another dimension. In an essay that is intended for distribution primarily from a web site, it seems appropriate to identify a further form of co-authorship, and label it ‘virtual co-authorship’.

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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hamlin, A. (2002). Buchanan and Wiseman. In: Brennan, G., Kliemt, H., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04810-8_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07551-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-04810-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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