Abstract
Previous experimental results of repeated coordination games show that subjects often end up in “poor” equilibria. Strategic uncertainty about the opponents’ moves induces players to select poor, but secure, equilibria. In our paper, we investigate how public information on previous moves of opponents may be used to reduce strategic uncertainty and, therefore, favor coordination on superior equilibria.
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Berninghaus, S.K., Ehrhart, KM. (2001). Information and Efficiency in Coordination Games: Recent Experimental Results. In: Debreu, G., Neuefeind, W., Trockel, W. (eds) Economics Essays. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04623-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04623-4_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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