The Economics of Network Industries

  • Günter Knieps
Chapter

Abstract

In this paper a disaggregated approach to network regulation is provided. The question is analyzed to what extent interconnection/access problems can be solved by voluntary market contracts of the parties involved and to what extent government interventions should be implemented. The key concept is the identification of monopolistic bottlenecks where market power can be identified ex ante. In all other parts of networks regulatory interventions are detrimental. Possible fallacies with respect to the regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks (inadequate price-setting rules, extending the regulatory basis) are pointed out.

Keywords

Microwave Europe Petroleum Transportation Monopoly 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Günter Knieps
    • 1
  1. 1.Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br.Germany

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