On the Robustness of the Analysis of Expectational Coordination: From 3 to n + 2 goods

  • Roger Guesnerie
Chapter

Abstract

The paper analyses the robustness of the conclusions previously obtained, showing that, in a simple three-goods model, the success of “eductive” expectational coordination is related to low supply elasticity, high demand elasticity, and high marginal propensity to consume (or high elementary Keynesian multiplier). Similar generalized factors have analogous qualitative effects, although new factors (heteroneity of beliefs) appear. Also, the positive coordination effect of the income effect, through the Keynesian multiplier action, is now less powerful.

Keywords

Propen Income Nash Volatility Librium 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roger Guesnerie
    • 1
  1. 1.Delta, joint unit CNRSEHESS, ENS, and Collège de FranceParisFrance

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