Abstract
A most natural kind of default assumptions we use in commonsense reasoning are conditional in nature, such as “Birds fly” or “Adults are employed”. Consequently, a theory of reasoning about such default conditionals should occupy a central place in the general theory of nonmonotonic reasoning.
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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bochman, A. (2001). Prolegomena to a Theory of Defeasible Entailment. In: A Logical Theory of Nonmonotonic Inference and Belief Change. Artificial Intelligence. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04560-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04560-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07516-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-04560-2
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