Abstract
Games and aggregative games. Characterization of games with strategic substitutes (Proposition 1.1). Existence (Proposition 1.2), uniqueness (Proposition 1.3), inefficiency (Proposition 1.4) and stability (Propositions 1.5–6) of Nash Equilibrium in aggregative games with strategic substitutes. Characterization of games with strategic complements (Proposition 1.7). Existence (Proposition 1.8), uniqueness (Proposition 1.9), inefficiency (Proposition 1.10) and stability (Proposition 1.11) of Nash Equilibrium in games with strategic complements. Appendix: Further results on the stability of Nash Equilibrium (Propositions 1.12–14).
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Corchón, L.C. (2001). Nash Equilibrium. In: Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04498-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04498-8_2
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