Neo-classical Economics and the Rational Justifiability of Moral Principles

  • Bernard Hodgson
Part of the Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy book series (SEEP)


The rational justifiability of basic ethical principles is a profoundly difficult problem and one that has been a perennial centre of philosophical controversy. A full-scale analysis of this issue would demand a discussion at least as long as this entire study. Accordingly, it will only be possible, in completing my examination of the theory of consumer choice (CCT), to provide some circumscribed and conditional comments about this vexed question, with particular concern for its bearing on the validation of neo-classical economics and this science’s conception of human freedom.


Moral Judgment Moral Argument Rational Assessment Rational Justifiability Factual Belief 
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    Such a theory should not be confused with the “rational psychology” pursued in mediaeval philosophy of mind, as the latter discipline was constituted by a purely a priori form of inquiry.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bernard Hodgson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTrent UniversityPeterboroughCanada

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