Abstract
The possibility, nature and evolution of capitalism have been a major concern for philosophers and political scientists since the very earliest periods of the emergence of markets. In historical retrospect an oscillation between two visions can be observed. For classical and, more recently, neoclassical economists, the market mechanism is basically self-equilibrating, the only source of crises being clumsy interventions on the part of political authorities or the legacy of inadequate and obsolete social relations. But first Marxists and then Keynesians have repeatedly argued the very opposite — that the pure market mechanism may lead to major crises, financial disequilibria, rising inequalities or stagnation and long run unemployment. Therefore state intervention in relation to the nationalization or socialization of investment decisions may help to maintain the viability of a mature capitalist system. This long swing in ideas about the role of the market has been clearly pointed out by Karl Polanyi (1944; 1983).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aglietta, M.: Regulation and Crisis of Capitalism, New York (Monthly Review Press) 1982. Original: Régulation et crise du capitalisme. L’expérience des Etats-Unis, Paris (Calmann-Levy) 1976.
Amable, B., Barré, R., Boyer, R.: A la recherche des systèmes d’innovation et production: Théorie, configurations et évolutions, Paris (Economica) 1997.
Amable, B., Boyer, R., Lordon, F.: “L’ad hoc en économie: la paille et la poutre”, in: A. D’autume, J. Cartelier (Eds.): L’Economie devient-elle une science dure?, Paris (Economica) 1995, pp. 267–290.
Arrow, K. J., Hahn, F.: General Competitive Analysis, San Francisco (Holden Day) 1971.
Barro, R. J., Sala-Martin, X.: Economic Growth, Stratford (Lucille H. Sutton and Scott D.) 1995.
Becker, G.: “Pourquoi le chômage est-il si élevé en Europe?”, Le Monde, 14 May 1996.
Benassy, J. P.: The Economics of Market Disequilibrium, Boston (Academic Press) 1982.
Benassy, J. P.: “Imperfect competition and unemployment”, Couverture Orange CEPREMAP, 1992.
Berger, S., Dore, R.: Globalization and national diversity, Ithaca (Cornell University Press) 1996.
Bowles, S., Gordon, D. M., Weisskopf, T. E.: Beyond the Waste Land, Garden City NJ (Double Day) 1983.
Boyer, R.: The Regulation School A Critical Introduction, New York (Columbia University Press) 1990.
Boyer, R.: “Markets: History, Theory and Policy” in: R. Hollingsworth, R. Boyer (Eds.): Contemporary Capitalism, The Embeddedness of Institutions, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 1997.
Boyer, R.: “Le politique à l’ère de la mondialisation et de la finance: le point sur quelques recherches régulationnistes”, L’Année de la régulation, 3 (1999), pp. 13–75.
Boyer, R., Drache, D. (Eds.): States Against Markets. The Limits of Globalization, London (Routledge) 1996.
Boyer, R., Saillard, Y. (Eds.): Théorie de la régulation. L’état des savoirs, Paris (La Découverte) 1995.
Braudel, F.: Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme XV–XVIIIe siècles, Paris (Armand Colin) 1979.
Contamin, R., Lacu, C.: “Origines et dynamiques de la crise asiatique”, L’Année de la Régulation, 2 1998, pp. 11–63.
Debreu, G.: Theory and Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, New York (John Wiley) 1959 [= Cowles Foundations Monograph No. 17].
Dehove, M.: “L’Union Européenne inaugure-t-elle un nouveau grand régime d’organisation des pouvoirs publics et de la société internationale ?”, L’Année de la régulation, 1 (1997), pp. 11–55.
Delorme, R., André, C.: L’Etat et l’économie, Paris (Seuil) 1983.
Dewatripont, M., Roland, G.: “Transition as a Process of Large-Scale Institutional Change”, Economics of Transition, 4/1 (1996), pp. 1–30.
Garcia, M. F.: “La construction sociale d’un marché parfait: le marché au cadran de Fontaines-en-Sologne”, Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 65 (1986), pp. 2–13.
Glyn, A.: “Contradictions of Capitalism”, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, London (MacMillan) 1988, pp. 638–640.
Granovetter, M., Swedberg, R.: The Sociology of Economic Life, San Francisco CA (Westview Press, Boulder) 1992.
Heilbroner, R. L.: “Capitalism”, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economies, London (MacMillan) 1988, pp. 347–353.
Hollingsworth, R., Boyer, R. (Eds.): The Embeddedness of Capitalist Institutions, New York (Oxford University Press) 1997.
Hollingsworth, R., Schmitter, P., Streeck, W. (Eds.): Governing Capitalist Economies: Performance and Control of Economie Sectors, New York (Oxford University Press) 1993.
Ingrao, B., Israel, G.: The Invisible Hand. Economie Equilibrium in the History of Science, Cambridge MA (The MIT Press) 1990.
Lordon, F.: “Endogenous Structural Change and Crisis in a Multiple Time-Scales Growth Model: A Stylized Formalization of the Exhaustion and Crisis of the Fordist Growth Regime”, Couverture Orange CEPREMAP, 9324 (1993).
Lucas, R. E.: Studies in Business Cycle Theory, Cambridge MA (The MIT Press), 1983.
Lucas, R. E.: “On the Mechanisms of Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 72, July (1988), pp. 3–42.
North, D.: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge/New York (Cambridge University Press) 1990.
Petit, P.: “Formes structurelles et régimes de croissance de l’après fordisme”, L’Année de la Régulation, 2 (1998), pp. 177–206.
Polanyi, K.: La grande transformation, Paris (Gallimard) 1983. Original: The Great Transformation (1944).
Posner, R. A.: The Economies of Justice, Cambridge MA (Harvard University Press) 1981.
Powell, W., Di Maggio, P. J. (Eds.): The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago (The University of Chicago Press) 1991.
Romer, P.: “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (1986), pp. 1002–1037.
Sabel, C. F.: “Constitutional Ordering in Historical Context”, in: F. W. Scharpf (Ed.): Games in Hierarchies and Networks, 1997.
Sapir, J.: Le Chaos Russe, Paris (La Découverte) 1996.
Shonfield, A.: Le capitalisme d’aujourd’hui. L’Etat et l’entreprise, Paris (Gallimard) 1967.
Stark, D.: “Privatization in Hungary: From Plan to Market or From Plan to Clan?”, East European Politics and Societies, 4/3 (1990), pp. 351–392.
Stark, D.: “Path Dependency and Privatization Strategies in East-Central Europe”, East European Politics and Societies, 6/1 (1992).
Stiglitz, J. E.: “The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price”, Journal of Economic Literature, 25 (1987), pp. 1–48.
Weil, P.: “Increasing returns and animal spirits”, American Economic Review, 4 (1989), pp. 889–894.
Wolf, C. Jr.: Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives, Cambridge MA /London (The MIT Press) 1990.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Boyer, R. (2001). The Regulation Approach as a Theory of Capitalism: A New Derivation. In: Labrousse, A., Weisz, JD. (eds) Institutional Economics in France and Germany. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04472-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04472-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08744-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-04472-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive