The Multiple International Monetary Standard

  • Heinz-Peter Spahn


In contrast to the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system, EMS and EMU had been designed as regional currency systems. Hence, the monetary relationship between EMU and the rest of the world is an open issue. There have been periods of “multipolar” currency systems (or non-systems) in the interwar years and after the demise of Bretton Woods, but due to the rapid developments on world financial markets it seems less useful to reassess experiences and debates. At the beginning of the new millennium, the time for fixed-exchange-rate regimes seems to have run out. Only very few, or very small, countries manage to peg their exchange rates to a foreign currency, mainly to the dollar.2


Exchange Rate Interest Rate Monetary Policy Central Bank Foreign Exchange 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heinz-Peter Spahn
    • 1
  1. 1.Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik, Institut für VolkswirtschaftslehreUniversity of Hohenheim (520 A)StuttgartGermany

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