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Predicting proposal configurations in cooperative games and exchange economies

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Current Trends in Economics

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Theory ((ECON.THEORY,volume 8))

Abstract

One considers stable configurations of proposals predicting coalition formation and effective payoffs, which are called uniform competitive solutions. Such “solutions” exist for almost all properly defined cooperative games and, therefore, can be proposed as substitute of the core. The new existence results obtained in the present paper concern also the case when the coalitional function of a game has empty values. All concepts and results are implemented in the competitive analysis of exchange economies.

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References

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Stefanescu, A. (1999). Predicting proposal configurations in cooperative games and exchange economies. In: Alkan, A., Aliprantis, C.D., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Current Trends in Economics. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 8. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08471-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-03750-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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