Abstract
26 known and new social choice rules are studied via computational experiments to reveal to which extent these rules are manipulable. 4 indices of manipulability are considered.
Yapi Kredi Bank (Turkey) provided two personal computers for carrying out the computations. Our colleagues Profs. C. Akçay, E. Alper, Y. Arat, S. Özmucur, A. Çarkoglu, M. Eder from Bogaziçi University (Istanbul, Turkey) gave us access to their personal computers for this work. Prof. G. Alpay kindly gave his permission to use the computer laboratory (10 PCs) presented to Bogaziçi University by Interbank. Prof. H. Ersel supported this work from the very beginning. Mrs. B. Börekçi gave us valuable technical assistance.
The work of F. Aleskerov was partially supported by Russian Foundation of Basic Research (grant 95–01 00057A), NATO Research Program (1995–1990), and the grant of European Community (INTAS Project ‘Measurement and Aggregation of Preferences’).
We express our thanks to all these colleagues and organizations.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aleskerov, F. “Procedures of Multicriterial Choice.” Preprints of the IFAC/IFORS Conference on Control Science and Technology for Development, Beijing, China, 1985.
Aleskerov, F. “Relational-Functional Voting Operators.” California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper, n. 818, 1992.
Banks, J. “Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control.” Social Choice and Welfare, v.1, 1985.
Brams, S. and P. Fishburn (1983) Approval Voting. Boston, Basil Blackwell.
Gibbard, A. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” Econometrica, v.41, 1973.
Kelly, J. “Almost All Social Choice Rules are Highly Manipulable, but Few aren’t.” Social Choice and Welfare, v.10, 1993.
Maschler, M. “The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleoulus.” in Handbook of Game Theory, (eds. R.J. Aumann and S. Hart), v.1, 1992.
Moulin, H. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Nurmi, H. Comparing Voting Systems. D. Reidel Publishing Comp., Dordrecht, 1987.
Pattanaik, P. Voting and Collective Choice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Satterthwaite, M.A. “Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions.” Journal of Economic Theory, v.10, 1975.
Sertel, M. and E. Kalaycioglu, “Türkiye için bir Seçim Yöntemi Tasarimina Dogru.” TÜSIAD, Istanbul, 1995 (in Turkish).
Smith, D. “Manipulability Measures of Common Social Choice Functions.” Social Choice and Welfare, (forthcoming)
Volsky, V. and Z. Lezina, “Voting in Small Groups.” Moscow. Nauka, 1991 (in Russian).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Aleskerov, F., Kurbanov, E. (1999). Degree of manipulability of social choice procedures. In: Alkan, A., Aliprantis, C.D., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Current Trends in Economics. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 8. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03750-8_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08471-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-03750-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive