Bargaining Between Automata
If the players in an alternating-offers bargaining game are averse to delays in reaching an agreement, then a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium exists. But the rationality requirements of the subgame-perfect equilibrium concept are too severe for this celebrated result of Ariel Rubinstein  to be relevant to the design of automated agents capable of negotiating on behalf of their clients. This paper therefore studies the play of bargaining games with alternating offers by finite automata.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Finite Automaton Repeated Game Bargaining Game Subgame Perfection
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