Simulating Multiparty Systems

  • Bjørn Lomborg
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 456)


The paper contains a simulation of a multiparty, multidimensional, imperfect information extension of Downs’ classic two party modelElsewhere, I show that there is at least one strict and dynamically stable Nash equilibrium for 2–9 parties in two. Here, I focus on the effects of alienation. With alienation it is shown that parties will not move out to compensate for losses at the fringes, as has been typically assumed, but actually move closer to the center.

Since Anthony Downs’ Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), much work has gone into generalizing the central result, stating that two parties in one dimension will place themselves at the position of the median voter. However, it has given considerable problems to introduce more than one dimension or more than two parties, although both is clearly needed to bring about more realism in the modeling.


Spatial Theory Median Voter Imperfect Information Indifference Curve Party System 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bjørn Lomborg
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of AarhusAarhus CDenmark

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