Abstract
We assess the evolution of cooperation and the viability of various strategies in an artificial world based upon a spatial n-actor IPD with actor movement. Simulation analyses indicate that the introduction of actor movement increases levels of cooperation. When stable cooperative worlds occur, they are generated by the formation of large networks of cooperative actors.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Majeski, S., Linden, G., Linden, C., Spitzer, A. (1997). A Spatial Iterated Prisoners Dilemma Game Simulation With Movement. In: Conte, R., Hegselmann, R., Terna, P. (eds) Simulating Social Phenomena. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 456. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03366-1_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63329-7
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