Abstract
Monotonic modal logics have long been used as means to study formal properties of such concepts as knowledge and belief. But they are not quite adequate to study knowledge (or belief) sets an agent constructs when he is reasoning not only from what is known to him but also from what is possible or consistent to assume Such reasonings are defeasible, that is, when the agent learns new facts some of the previous derivations are not valid any more. In order to capture the phenomenon of nonmonotonicity, classical provability operators have to be modified. We have already studied in detail one nonmonotonic formalism, namely the logic of defaults, defined by means of the notion of a context-dependent proof.
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© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Marek, V.W., Truszczyński, M. (1993). Modal nonmonotonic logics. In: Nonmonotonic Logic. Artificial Intelligence. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02906-0_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02906-0_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-02908-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-02906-0
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