Abstract
There are various ways in which decisions can be taken in a society. In the modern industrialized societies of the western hemisphere the two most prominent methods by which societal decisions are being made are
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(a)
the voting procedure which effectuates political as well as economic choices (for the latter type of choice consider for example a city-council’s decision on the extent of supply of public goods) and
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(b)
the market mechanism which by coordinating individual decisions through the price system brings about economic choices.
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Gaertner, W., Klemisch-Ahlert, M. (1992). Models of Bargaining and Distributive Justice. In: Social Choice and Bargaining Perspectives on Distributive Justice. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 387. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02811-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02811-7_3
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