Abstract
Game equilibrium models are descriptions of interactive decision situations by game in extensive or normal form. The analysis of such models is based on the equilibriL point concept, often refined by additional requirements like subgame perfectness. Thseries consists of four volumes:
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I:
Evolution and Game Dynamics
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II:
Methods, Morals and Markets
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III:
Strategic Bargaining
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IV:
Social and Political Interaction.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Selten, R. (1991). Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”. In: Selten, R. (eds) Game Equilibrium Models I. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-08108-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-02674-8
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