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On the Role of Dynamics and Information in International Negotiations: The Case of Fishery Management

  • Veijo Kaitala
  • Raimo Hämäläinen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 248)

Abstract

Fishery resource management is an intrinsically dynamic problem where current harvest decisions affect the possibilities of harvesting in the future. Moreover, in the case of two or more harvesting agents, the harvesters face a complicated dynamic game problem the solution of which depends on the behavioural strategies adopted (cooperative or non-cooperative management, myopic or foresighted optimization etc). Decision making in such an environment means negotiations and bargaining on the management strategies as well as on the planning horizon considered. These questions will be discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 we will illustrate problems which are related to the practical negotiation policies in international fishery management.

Keywords

Dynamic Game Exclusive Economic Zone Maximum Sustainable Yield Harvest Rate Cooperative Solution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Veijo Kaitala
    • 1
  • Raimo Hämäläinen
    • 1
  1. 1.Systems Analysis LaboratoryHelsinki University of TechnologyEspooFinland

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