Abstract
This is the first in a projected series of papers on solutions to games in matrix and extensive form. The predominant solution concept in the literature is that of the noncooperative equilibrium put forward by Nash (1951).
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Shubik, M. (1985). Plausible Outcomes for Games in Strategic Form. In: Grauer, M., Thompson, M., Wierzbicki, A.P. (eds) Plural Rationality and Interactive Decision Processes. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 248. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02432-4_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02432-4_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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