Plausible Outcomes for Games in Strategic Form

  • Martin Shubik
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 248)

Abstract

This is the first in a projected series of papers on solutions to games in matrix and extensive form. The predominant solution concept in the literature is that of the noncooperative equilibrium put forward by Nash (1951).

Keywords

Burning Attenuation Bark Arena Nash 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Shubik
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsYale UniversityNew HavenUSA

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