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Regulierungsregime in Theorie und Praxis

  • Martin Kunz
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Zusammenfassung

Noch vor 20 Jahren wurde die Regulierung von marktmächtigen natürlichen Monopolen als command and control-Aufgabe verstanden. Wesentlicher Bestandteil einer solchen Strategie ist die Ausübung eines unmittelbaren Einflusses auf unternehmerische Entscheidungen, der mit Hilfe von Genehmigungen und Sanktionen durchgesetzt wird (vgl. z.B. Baldwin/Cave, 1999, S. 34–39). So verwundert es nicht, dass viele Veröffentlichungen auf der Suche nach einem Referenzmaßstab für eine optimale Regulierung die Ableitung von optimalen Tarifen in den Vordergrund stellen, deren Implementierungsmöglichkeiten jedoch selten hinterfragt wurden.

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  • Martin Kunz

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