Social Institutions and Local Interaction Structure

  • Siegfried K. Berninghaus


We consider the evolution of social institutions in a finite population of boundedly rational players. By applying methods from the theory of threshold-automata networks we are able to analyze the effects of local interaction and communication structures in the population on the ‘quality’ of social institutions.


Social Norm Social Institution Coordination Problem Strategy Choice Strategy Profile 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Siegfried K. Berninghaus
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für Statistik and Mathematische WirtschaftstheorieUniversität KarlsruheGermany

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