Abstract
Power is often identified as the central concept in political science. Yet there is little scholarly consensus on how to define power, how to observe and measure it, or even how to think about it. Indeed, March [1966, p. 70] has concluded that “on the whole... power is a disappointing concept.”
Much of this essay is drawn from a paper presented to the 1978 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, Louisiana. For helpful suggestions, I am indebted to several participants at that meeting, to my colleagues Louis Cantori, David Jacobs, and Christopher Kelly, and to the editor of this volume.
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© 1981 Physica-Verlag, Würzburg (Germany)
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Miller, N.R. (1981). Power in Game Forms. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) Power, Voting, and Voting Power. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-00411-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-00411-1_2
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