Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body

  • P. D. StraffinJr.
  • M. D. Davis
  • S. J. Brams


In a voting body making dichotomous (for or against) decisions under a specified decision rule, there are two questions which are important to an individual member concerned with evaluating his or her position in the body. We will phrase these questions in probabilistic terms.


Majority Rule Power Index Coalition Formation Simple Game Vote Power 
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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag, Würzburg (Germany) 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • P. D. StraffinJr.
    • 1
  • M. D. Davis
    • 2
  • S. J. Brams
    • 2
  1. 1.BeloitUSA
  2. 2.New YorkUSA

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