Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body
In a voting body making dichotomous (for or against) decisions under a specified decision rule, there are two questions which are important to an individual member concerned with evaluating his or her position in the body. We will phrase these questions in probabilistic terms.
KeywordsMajority Rule Power Index Coalition Formation Simple Game Vote Power
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