Electoral Rules and Rational Voting: The Effect of Candidate Viability Perceptions on Voting Decisions
Duverger’s classic work on political parties  established a theoretical link between electoral rules and the number of viable parties. Systematic empirical evidence for this linkage has been provided by Rae . The proposition that plurality rules produce two-party competition and majority rules, a multi-party system, has assumed the status of a sociological law.1) This tendency probably operates through the coercive effect of electoral rules on the candidate preferences of individuals.
KeywordsAmerican Political Science Review Plurality Rule Vote Decision Candidate Preference Electoral College
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