Electoral Rules and Rational Voting: The Effect of Candidate Viability Perceptions on Voting Decisions
Duverger’s classic work on political parties  established a theoretical link between electoral rules and the number of viable parties. Systematic empirical evidence for this linkage has been provided by Rae . The proposition that plurality rules produce two-party competition and majority rules, a multi-party system, has assumed the status of a sociological law.1) This tendency probably operates through the coercive effect of electoral rules on the candidate preferences of individuals.
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