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An Introduction to the Analysis of Power, Voting, and Voting Power

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Power, Voting, and Voting Power

Abstract

In the following I will outline the central ideas of this book by presenting the various contributions and by analyzing the basic concepts and their relevance. This introduction is certainly no substitute for the book. Any summary of the articles herein which exceeds the level of enumeration inevitably turns into a discussion.

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© 1981 Physica-Verlag, Würzburg (Germany)

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Holler, M.J. (1981). An Introduction to the Analysis of Power, Voting, and Voting Power. In: Holler, M.J. (eds) Power, Voting, and Voting Power. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-00411-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-00411-1_1

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-00413-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-00411-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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