Abstract
Sardex money functioning is a complex bond which combines the characteristics of the Sardex currency, the members’ network regulation and specific social mechanisms. The interaction of these elements creates social effects which have been summarised as effects on trust, cooperation and solidarity. Trust in the Sardex network is a new form of trust defined as a “community trust”. This trust sustains high levels of cooperation and also facilitates the emergence of solidarity from the forms of collective action it inspires. This chapter explains that the social effects of the Sardex currency are generated by specific mechanisms, in particular: (i) effects on trust, generated by selection, signalling, reciprocity, monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms; (ii) effects on cooperation which are the outcome of specific generative mechanisms; (iii) effects on solidarity, generated by opportunity, desire, belief and collective-action mechanisms. The general working principles of each social mechanism are described, followed by an analysis of how these mechanisms work within the Sardex currency. The chapter concludes with a fourth section, which summaries the relationships between the social mechanisms described.
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Notes
- 1.
Thanks are due to Prof. Andrea Maurer for her constant support and rigorous approach in identifying the social mechanisms operating within the Sardex experience.
- 2.
For an analysis of the reasons for joining the network see Sub-sect. 4.3.2.
- 3.
The founders of Sardex had the same priorities in the early stages of the Sardex project.
- 4.
Thanks are due to Jens Beckert for this description of the different forms of trust in Sardex. To compare community forms of trust with trust in the industrial district see Sub-sect. 5.1.2 Transaction costs and brokerage.
- 5.
For the shared ideals see Sect. 4.3.
- 6.
Although thick trust enhances the effects in some cases, it is also present in the network independently of any repeated interaction.
- 7.
Although these social effects are similar to those observed in community relationships, the origin of this form of social bonding is radically different: strong community social bonds are the result of tradition oriented action and of ascribed status, while the thick social bonds present in the Sardex network emerge from within an economic network freely chosen by the participants who can leave the network if they so desire.
- 8.
Attempts to orientate both top-down and horizontal behaviours leave room for the possibility of free-riding: even in the most stringent social systems the possibility of free-riding cannot be completely eliminated. The possibility of escaping from the existing social order, or of opposing it, is hard to eliminate even from totalitarian regimes, though they are capable of ensuring such behaviour is extremely costly and disadvantageous. Free-riding can have a positive connotation as an area of individual freedom that may offer possibilities for changing the existing social order (Arendt 1973).
- 9.
For an interpretation of these effects on transaction costs, compared to the industrial district see Sub-sect. 5.1.2 Transaction costs and brokerage.
- 10.
In the case of companies founded less than ten years ago, only the years of business activity were taken into account.
- 11.
Where the entrepreneurs had not made this distinction in their accounts it was decided that any reduction in euro revenue and euro customers would be considered as an effect of substitution by Sardex business although this estimate could potentially exceed the effective substitutions because some of the fall in euro business may have been due to other uncontrollable factors.
- 12.
For a discussion of the risks and benefits associated with high levels of cooperation in the market see Sub-sect. 5.1.3 Competition, cooperation and innovation.
- 13.
To explain the emergence of solidarity in Sardex, the following sub-sections adopt the action theory described by Hedström as DBO theory (Desires, Beliefs, Opportunities) (2005, p. 38 ff.).
- 14.
On the economic effects of these limitations see Sect. 5.1 Sardex as an instrument of economic policy.
- 15.
The possibility of predicting explanations of social phenomena is very limited and the validity of doing so is debated. For an introduction to the topic see Clarke et al. 2016, part. 1.
- 16.
“The mechanisms through which beliefs are formed tend to be ‘causal’ (as distinct from intentional) from the focal individual’s point of view, and typically operate ‘behind the back’ of the individual. Dissonance reduction … is an important example of a process in which the actions of some bring about dissonance and subsequent changes in the beliefs of others. Although the process is an unintended outcome of other individuals’ actions, actions nevertheless are what make them tick, and therefore analyses of social interactions between intentional actors are the core concern. This was certainly an important reason why Weber explicitly defined sociology as a science that concerns itself with understanding and explaining the causes and consequences of social action” (Hedström 2005, p. 43).
- 17.
The definition of collective action is linked to different interpretations, often connected to specific research areas that use a particular concept. The following discussion refers mainly to the definition adopted in The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology (Baldassarri 2009).
- 18.
In peripheral EU countries, the most recent tendency among the so-called “anti-system” political movements, when interpreting the effects of the euro currency, is to associate it with an instrument used by the central more powerful countries or by supranational financial institutions for controlling or even exploiting weaker countries.
- 19.
For the effects on innovation see Sub-sect. 5.1.3 Competition, cooperation and innovation.
- 20.
The presence of hybrid forms of social action harks back to one of the classic debates in the social sciences. Among the various assumptions that led to disciplinary differentiation in the social sciences, the concept of economic action played an important role in developing different research methods and explanatory models for understanding social phenomena. Neoclassical economists explain individual social action as being constantly guided towards maximising individual utility, while for the sociologists “actions oriented towards finding a means of subsistence are not necessarily characterised by a rational allocation of scarce resources” (Trigilia 2002, p. 18). To explain economic action, one needs to consider “actions oriented towards different non-utilitarian goals (ibid.), as human beings are “driven by conflicting, antithetical impulses which we “understand” as a whole” (Weber 1922; cit. Trigilia 2002, p. 20).
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Bazzani, G. (2020). Social Mechanisms Influenced by Sardex. In: When Money Changes Society. Wirtschaft + Gesellschaft. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28533-3_4
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