Abstract
An issue often raised by economists concerns the consistency of trade-related incentive mechanisms in IEAs with the legal framework of the WTO (Limão, 2007, pp. 849-850, Ederington, 2010, pp. 92-93, 97, Das, 2015, pp. 24-25 and many others). Their argument is that trade sanctions such as border-tax adjustments (BTAs) and plurilateral types of regional trade integration are by their very nature discriminatory and, hence, they would violate the common status of Most-Favored Nation (MFN) treatment stipulated by GATT Art. I and para. 1 of GATS Art. II. This clause according to which any trade advantage granted by a WTO member to another country shall be provided to any other WTO member, constitutes the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination for multilateral trade liberalization within the WTO (UNESCAP, 2008, pp. 217-218).
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Zenker, A. (2020). Compatibility with the WTO Framework. In: International Climate Agreements under Review. Energiepolitik und Klimaschutz. Energy Policy and Climate Protection. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28151-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28151-9_5
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