Zusammenfassung
Das 2014 vorgestellte Instrument „Risk Assessment for Violent Extremism“ (RAVE) ist hinsichtlich seiner methodischen Anlage und technischen Umsetzung einer der anspruchsvollsten RBeG-Ansätze. Es fußt auf den Erkenntnissen der neurokognitiven Wissenschaften und besteht aus zwei Komponenten – einem auf kognitiven Indikatoren basierenden SPJ-Instrument (RAVE selbst) und einer Visualisierungssoftware, die es ermöglicht, die Vulnerabilitätsfaktoren der zu bewertenden Personen in einem geometrischen Modell des Risikokontinuums zu platzieren (GRiPe: Geometric Risk Indicator Positioning of Extremists).
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Notes
- 1.
The VERA-2R is the world’s leading risk-assessment instrument in the field of countering violent extremism (CVE), URL: https://www.vera-2r.nl/implementing-the-vera-2r/global-and-european-implementation/index.aspx (19. Oktober 2018).
- 2.
Dies soll wie folgt erfolgen: „A Complex Dynamic Casualty model can be built based on a quasi-Venn concept where there are logical relations between the risk indicators. These indicators can be classified into three different sets for a representational model: Set A (representing attitudes, beliefs and ideology); Set B (representing bonds, context, intention, friendships, networks, groups/personal associations) and Set C (representing capacities, historical experiences, training). All the indicators in the VERA-2 tool can be restructured into these three sets for the model. It is possible to restructure all the VERA-2 indicators into these three sets. Motivation, for example, based on moral values would be restructured into Set A, whereas criminal opportunism as a driver would be reallocated to Set C (capacity and historical elements)“ (Pressman 2016, S. 258).
- 3.
„The face validity of the VERA and VERA Version 2 has been demonstrated via empirical evidence obtained from expert operational users over the past 5 years. National intelligence analysts, national police services officers, psychiatrists and psychologists in multiple countries in Europe, North America and Asia who are working in national security positions and in terrorism prevention activities have been using the VERA 2 and have reported that it is relevant to their analytical needs. Although face validity is considered to be the simplest form of validity, when such validity is provided at the subject matter expert level in violent extremism and terrorism, and when this face validity is recognized by national and international counterterrorism agencies, the robustness of the face validity is significantly higher. This can be classified as ‚Expert Adjudicated‘ and Operational Validity“ („expert adjudicated face validity“) (Pressman 2016, S. 262).
- 4.
Hart et al. (2017, S. 15) behaupten demgegenüber, dass ERG aufgrund einer „systematischen Analyse existierender Tools (inkl. VERA 2 und MLG)“ entstanden sei, was den Angaben der ERG-Entwickler widerspricht (Lloyd und Dean 2015).
- 5.
„Any offense associated with a group, cause or ideology that propagates extremist views and actions and justifies the use of violence and other illegal conduct in pursuit of its objectives“ (National Offender Management Service, 2007).
- 6.
„[…] the first dimension concerns the process of engagement and includes the factors that motivate an individual to engage with a group, cause, or ideology. The second concerns the degree of intent or readiness to offend associated with the individual mindset, including what they would do and to what end. The third concerns the individual’s capability of carrying out an act of terrorism. […] Aspects of capability can also provide information about intent where individuals had clearly developed a capability for terrorism through, for example, amassing materials for bomb making or reconnoitring possible terrorist sites. Experience suggests that capability is perhaps the most difficult dimension to assess and requires clarity over what level of capability is of concern“ (Lloyd und Dean 2015, S. 46).
- 7.
An 17 % der erwähnten 142 Terroranschläge (insgesamt 24 Ereignisse, mehrheitlich in Frankreich) waren Frauen entweder als Mitglieder in gemischten bzw. rein weiblichen Gruppen beteiligt oder sie handelten allein. Im Durchschnitt bei 25 % (2014 – 4 Ereignisse bzw. 27 %; 2015 – ein Ereignis bzw. 3 %; 2016 – 22 Ereignisse bzw. 37 %; bis Mitte 2017 – acht Ereignisse bzw. 27 %) lag die Beteiligung von Teenagern an geplanten oder ausgeführten Anschlägen auf dem europäischen Kontinent (vgl. Simcox 2017, S. 2).
- 8.
Das Verhältnis zwischen der Zahl der Ausgewanderten und Anschlagsplanungen in Europa lag 2015 bei eins zu 360 bzw., nach pessimistischer Schätzung, eins zu 100.
- 9.
„While returning Foreign Fighters have not as yet added significantly to the threat of terrorism around the world, the number of attacks inspired or directed by the Islamic State continues to rise. All returnees, whatever their reason for going home, will continue to pose some degree of risk. […] Whether or not encouraged or directed by returnees, the domestic terrorist threat from IS supporters who did not go to Syria, Iraq or another IS front, will remain real for many years to come“ (Barrett 2017, S. 14).
- 10.
„In 30 of the 142 plots (21 percent), there was at least one individual or member of the cell who was known to have received terrorist training or had combat experience abroad. […] Five of these 30 plots (17 percent) led to casualties. This is a comparably low number when compared to the number of plots overall: There were casualties of some kind (either injuries or deaths) in 35 plots in which there was no training at all. However, the five plots that were successfully executed led to approximately 694 injuries (49 percent of the total of all injuries since January 2014) and 178 deaths (55 percent of the total of all injuries since January 2014). Therefore, while these types of plots may have low success rates, they are particularly devastating when they occur“ (Simcox 2017, S. 6).
- 11.
Vgl. zur Bedeutung der Al-Qaida-Camps für die Sozialisation zum globalen Dschihadismus: Hegghammer (1979, S. 135).
- 12.
„Thus, according to the definition of foreign fighting used in this research project, only 11 out of 123 (8.9 %) individuals can be categorised as Western foreign fighters. This would rather point to a rate of 1 out of 11. There are some other ways of looking at this data that could be useful. In 13 of the 26 plots (50 %), there was at least one individual who went abroad to either fight or train. In 5 of those 13 cases (38.5 %) of individuals who went abroad, the motivation was because at least one individual joined an insurgency while in the other 8 cases (61.5 %) it was because at least one individual went to a training camp. Therefore, 5 of the 26 plots (19.2 %) had at least one individual involved who can be defined as a Western foreign fighter. 8 of the 26 plots (30.8 %) had a link to a Western individual who went to a terrorist training camp“ (de Roy van Zuijdewijn 2014, S. 65).
- 13.
Auch Bundesregierung und Sicherheitsdienste haben stets behauptet, der IS würde seine Kader nicht als Flüchtlinge einschleusen, da Europa mit gefälschten oder gestohlenen Papieren und einem Ticket viel leichter zu erreichen sei (der IS konnte in Rakka etwa 3800 Blankopässe erbeuten). Die Visumspflicht scheint dabei nicht als relevanter Faktor in Betracht gezogen worden zu sein.
- 14.
„In 64 of the 142 plots (45 percent), one or more perpetrators were known to have been in contact with a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). In 27 of these 64 plots (42 percent), this contact was solely electronic. In 62 plots, the FTO in question was ISIS; on one occasion it was both ISIS and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria (then known as Jabhat al-Nusra); and on one occasion it was al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen“ (Simcox 2017, S. 6).
- 15.
„In 15 of the 22 German plots (68 percent), one of the cell’s perpetrators was in direct contact with a foreign terrorist organization. This is disproportionately high: In total, only 64 of the 142 plots (45 percent) had one or more members known to have been in contact with a FTO“ (Simcox 2017, S. 8).
- 16.
„Twenty-two of the 142 plots (15 percent) featured refugees and asylum seekers, either planning attacks alone or as part of a larger cell. 14 Refugees and asylum seekers linked to these plots came to Europe from a range of countries: Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Russia’s Southern Caucasus, and Uzbekistan. There were also refugees from Algeria, although they entered Europe posing as Syrians. […] Yet overall, the threat to Europe from refugees and asylum seekers plotting has been concentrated in Germany – 12 of the 22 plots (54 percent), with an additional case in which a suspected attack planned for Copenhagen was being organized from Baden-Württemberg in Germany. […] Plots involving refugees or asylum seekers most commonly targeted civilians (59 percent) and, where known, explosives were the most popular weapon of choice (32 percent)“ (Simcox 2017, S. 7).
- 17.
„We know that most migrants from the Muslim world enter the lower end of the labour market, because they arrive with low education. Their children often stay in the same social class because their fortune, like everyone else’s, is shaped by their parents’ social capital. If we believe that economic deprivation contributes to radicalization, then we must also recognize that high levels of low-skill immigration from the Muslim world may cause security problems in the long term“ (Hegghammer 2016, S. 14).
- 18.
Zu scheinbaren Evidenzen und vermeintlicher „Bauchempirie“ vgl. Abou Taam (2018, S. 10).
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Logvinov, M. (2019). Messverfahren und Risikoinstrumente im Vergleich. In: Risikobewertung extremistischer Gewalt. Radikalisierung – De-Radikalisierung – Prävention. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25123-9_3
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