Abstract
In law-and-economics, it is fashionable to say that the common law is efficient. One oft-intoned explanation, unmistakably Austrian in its provenance, is that the decentralised courts are informationally superior to the centralised legislature. Modern authors afford that view near-axiomatic deference.
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© 2018 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature
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Yalnazov, O. (2018). Information, Precedent, and Statute. In: Precedent and Statute. Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts I Economic Analysis of Law . Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24385-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24385-2_8
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Publisher Name: Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden
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Online ISBN: 978-3-658-24385-2
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