If solidarity is the answer, what was the question?

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss the idea of having solidarity as the fundamental principle for welfare structures, and the call for a strengthened principle of solidarity as a guideline in applied ethics. More precisely, I focus on analysing the motivation and argumentation behind solidarity. What normative and conceptual roles is solidarity supposed to play? For the most part, solidarity has been suggested as a contrast, alternative, or supplement to accounts that are seen to overemphasise individualism, proceduralism, and autonomy. However, I argue that what this criticism requires is not a thick theory of solidarity, but merely a thin account recognising the social contexts human beings live in. In fact, I claim that any thicker views on solidarity, applied to policy-oriented theory, create contradictory outcomes to the original aims for highlighting solidarity. Solidarity is a concept oriented towards the individual, and thick concepts of solidarity easily incorporate asymmetrical, exclusionist, and moralistic tendencies into the discussion. The proponents of solidarity should be careful to keep the “thick” and “thin” levels of solidarity separate.