Genome Editing, Non-Identity and the Notion of Harm

Abstract

New technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9 promise and allow precise and astonishingly simple ways of editing the human genome. They thereby fuel the wish to cure serious genetic diseases by eradicating them where they emerge – in the genome itself. In order to assess this technology from an analytic-philosophical perspective I want to question whether its application violates the principle of nonmaleficence. By pointing out the now famous Non-Identity Problem (NIP) Derek Parfit showed that this proves to be very difficult in cases in which our actions affect the welfare together with the identity of future living individuals. My interest in this paper is in exploring whether we face the NIP in the case of genome editing, or not. In my view, a two-tier analysis is needed, distinguishing between the question of harm to the “edited-embryo” itself and harm to its descendants in the case of genetic interventions in the germline. While we do not face the NIP in the first generation of genetically edited embryos, and while there is a high risk of harm in these cases, it does hold in the next generation, which makes it surprisingly hard to oppose invasions in the human germline with the help of the principle of nonmaleficence. I present and discuss my analysis here, which might help to resolve certain misconceptions of harm and to set boundaries in an apparently harm-free area.