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Impact of demonstrated remote attacks on security of connected vehicles

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Fahrerassistenzsysteme 2016

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Zusammenfassung

The recent [3] successful attack on a current connected car has proven the practicability of remote attacks on connected vehicles. It is no longer a theory that can be dismissed or ignored in the development of automotive systems. The effort involved was not beyond what is to be expected for some attackers with a strong motivation.

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Literatur

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Correspondence to Markus Ihle .

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© 2018 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature

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Ihle, M., Glas, B. (2018). Impact of demonstrated remote attacks on security of connected vehicles. In: Isermann, R. (eds) Fahrerassistenzsysteme 2016. Proceedings. Springer Vieweg, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-21444-9_8

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