Schlüsselwörter

1 Introduction

In recent years, social media has become ubiquitous in professional politics. While only a decade ago studies still showed gaps in what kinds of politicians utilized new media technology (Gulati and Williams 2007), from websites to micro-blogging, the near-total embrace of these kinds of resources today has resulted in a shift from analyses about who uses new media tools to how they are used (Farrar-Myers and Vaughn 2015). Meanwhile, public adoption of social media has also increased enormously. In 2005, when the Pew Research Center started to track social media adoption, only 5 % of adults in the United States used at least one social media platform; by early 2017 that figure had increased to 69 % (Pew Research Center 2017). Furthermore, members of the press, who often provide essential filter and linkage functions between political elites and the masses, have also adjusted to this new media landscape. Journalists increasing use online sourcing in their work, not only reporting on what is said and done in the social media space but also using social media tools themselves to both contact potential sources and disseminate stories and news developments (Lecheler and Kruikemeier 2015).

Clearly, from the perspective of politicians and other political elites, in a world where much of the electorate is engaged online and much of what the media says and does also functions online, there is great incentive to use new media tools—and, in particular, social media—in ways that systematically increase the likelihood of achieving goals, whether those goals are electoral, political, or policy-oriented. As Farrar-Myers and Vaughn have noted, “we have reached the point where having a social media presence via a website, Facebook page, and Twitter account is a necessary means to be an effective political communicator” (Farrar-Myers and Vaughn 2015, p. 2). They go on, however, to note that “merely having such a presence is hardly sufficient to ensure that one’s message is reaching its intended audience, not being drowned out—or, worse, distorted—by competing messages” (ibid.). The fundamental point being made is that making use of social media technology is only half the battle; using those tools in a strategic manner (i.e., designed to enhance goal achievement) is what matters. In an era where everyone has easy access to multiple social media accounts, those who use them with discipline, skill, and precision are the most likely to fare the best.

Such an observation is not new to communications professionals or those who study communications professionally. Indeed, a wide range of advice can be found in and outside of the various relevant academic literatures about how best to utilize social media for maximum impact. And while analysis has begun to assess the affects of new technologies and avenues of communication on democratic values, like civility and participation (Feezell et al. 2016; Koc-Michalska and Lilleker 2016), far less attention has been paid to how social media presents a potential threat to the candidates and politicians who use them. In this essay, we seek to address that oversight and do so by examining multiple ways social media can have the opposite effect of what the strategic communications gurus would suggest. To do so, we use a contemporary case—the early months of Donald J. Trump’s presidency—as a lens through which to view and engage how social media can effectively undermine an actor’s message.

2 The Dark Side of Strategic Communication

Still a relatively young and fundamentally interdisciplinary field, even the meaning of strategic communication remains contested. For clarity’s sake, we follow the lead of Hallahan et al., who have stressed strategic communication’s emphasis on “the strategic application of communication and how an organization functions as a social actor to advance its mission” (2007, p. 7). Strategic communication is fundamentally focused on utilization of resources and management of techniques, often across a wide and complex range of divisions, for the purpose of achieving identified objectives. In other words, strategic communication is goal-oriented at its core, in terms of not only the information being communicated, but also the way(s) in which it is communicated, both in terms of tone and technique. With respect to the latter, as technology proliferates, so too does the size of the toolbox the strategic communication professional carries. As the communication space becomes increasingly digitized, so too do the ways strategic communication efforts are deployed.

Our particular interest is in how political elites utilize strategic communication techniques as they seek to achieve their political and policy objectives. We are not alone in this interest, though much of the work focusing on strategic political communication—especially in the digital sphere—emphasizes either descriptive discussions of new opportunities for strategic communication or analyses of how strategic communication efforts functioned, with an underlying impulse to document how elites can better communicate in order to get what they want. For example, much of the literature on presidents ‘going public’ exist to documents which factors ‘work’ in shaping public opinion. The emerging consensus here suggests that presidents who want to lead in this way are best advised to stay on message, get out of Washington D.C., work local and regional media opportunities rather than national outlets, and deploy surrogates widely while ensuring they are each echoing the president’s message (Kernell 2006).

The bulk of research that exists on social media and strategic communication has developed in a similar fashion; whether by packaging together observation-driven advice on how to use social media in the pursuit of key objectives (Kaplan and Haenlen 2010; Culnan et al. 2010) or by drawing conclusions from empirical analyses (Levenshus 2010; LaMarre and Suzuki-Lambrecht 2013; Macnamara and Zerfass 2012; Picazo-Vela et al. 2012; Saffer et al. 2013), the implicit theme of this work is that new technology can be harnessed in effective ways, if approached wisely and strategically. What this work largely leaves unsaid, however, is the danger technological proliferation also presents to political elites’ prospects for goal achievement. That is, in their rush to document which factors work and when and why, not enough light is shed on what we call the dark side of strategic communication. That is, just as new media technologies present diverse and dynamic opportunities for political elites to control the message, they also present myriad opportunities for misuse, whether inadvertent or willful, to undermine the strategic narrative they are trying to establish. By analyzing instances of new media-driven strategic communication failure, we can augment and enhance our understanding of the current and future strategic communication environment. Moreover, by emphasizing the political sector, we can add to what we know about how new media and strategic communication affect the policy making process.Footnote 1

We argue that new media-driven strategic communication failure can manifest in the policy making process in four distinct but important ways. First, in ascending order of severity, non-strategic use of new media can distract desired public attention from key agenda items. Second, it can confuse or muddy the policy agenda. Third, non-strategic communication via social media can alienate potential coalition partners. Finally, non-strategic use of new media can directly derail policy goals by providing evidence to others in powerful positions of negative consequences and/or unacceptable motivations.

To support this four-part argument, we identify and contextualize specific situations from the first year of Donald J. Trump’s presidency. For an example of when Trump’s use of social media distracted public attention from key agenda items, we discuss his Twitter-based attack of Mika Brzezinski, which pulled attention away from momentum then being made in the House of Representatives on the president’s policy priority, the repeal of the Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare). With respect to confusing or muddying the policy agenda, we discuss Trump’s inconsistent communications about the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which his administration announced would be done away with but later that same day Trump tweeted he would revisit in several months if Congress failed to enact legislation, reforming immigration. In regard to alienating potential coalition partners, we focus on Trump’s use of social media to harangue Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who is an essential partner for the White House in achieving any policy goal, but especially Obamacare repeal. Finally, with respect to directly derailing policy goals, we examine the consequences of Trump’s tweeting about the so-called travel ban, which led a federal court to reject the administration’s executive order because his social media communications provided evidence of discriminatory intent. In the sections that follow, we discuss each of these cases in turn.

3 The Undermining of Trump via Twitter: Four Strategic Communication Failures

The 2016 election was unique for a number of reasons, the least of which was the candidates’ reliance on the social media platform, Twitter, to communicate to and with their supporters, critics, and each otherFootnote 2. However, this platform was consequential, by most accounts. And yet, after winning the election, Trump vowed to be, “very restrained, if I use it at all,” responding to whether he would continue to communicate via Twitter, after inauguration (Flores 2016). Despite this comment, his frequency of taking to Twitter to share his commentary barely slowed, and political observers have been tracking his tweets, their expressed sentiment (Kurtzleben 2017), and even the people and places Trump has insulted from the platform (Lee and Quealy 2017). At the Washington Post, political scientist Dan Drezner argued that Trump tweets as frequently, and as caustically, as he does for three reasons: to blow off steam, feed his base, and to rebel against institutional constraints (Drezner 2017). Needless to say, the interest in Trump’s tweeting, continues. Here, we are less interested in how or why Trump tweets, and more interested in the effects.

3.1 Agenda Distraction: The Mika Brzezinski Tweets

One harmful effect of Trump’s tweets is that they have distracted from his legislative agenda as well as Republican policy victories, arguably thwarting momentum and obstructing public good will. According to reporting in late June 2017, the Trump White House was set to usher through two conservative immigration bills—one that would strengthen penalties for deported criminals who reenter the United States and a second will that would target sanctuary cities. In preparation, earlier in the week Trump met with victims of crimes perpetrated by undocumented immigrants, and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director shared prepared remarks at a White House press briefing.

However, Trump’s immigration agenda was derailed, after he fired off a couple of bazaar and vulgar tweets directed at MSNBC’s Morning Joe co-anchors, Mika Brzezinski and Joe Scarborough, early on Thursday, June 29. Trump tweeted:

I heard poorly rated @Morning_Joe speaks badly of me (don’t watch anymore). Then how come low I.Q. Crazy Mika, along with Psycho Joe, came. (June 29, 2017, 7:52am)

…to Mar-a-Lago 3 nights in a row around New Year’s Eve, and insisted on joining me. She was bleeding badly from a face-lift. I said no! (June 29, 2017, 7:58am)

The speculation is that Trump was watching the Fox news program, Hannity, who’s host, Sean Hannity, was covering a segment about the increasing criticism of Trump by Mika Brzezinski, and her co-host Joe Scarborough on their MSNBC program. Although Morning Joe’s Joe Scarborough and President Trump were once on good terms (Joe was one of 43 Twitter accounts Trump was following on Twitter after his Inauguration (Businessinsider 2017), and Trump was known to watch the program regularly in the past, as the hosts grew more critical of his administration, Trump’s opinion of the hosts soured. This is what likely prompted Trump’s tweets.

Trump’s criticism of Brzezinski and Scarborough, drew an immediate response. In particular his mentioning of Brzezinski’s physical appearance drew immediate condemnation; even fellow Republicans were force to respond. In a House Republicans news conference later that day, when asked about the tweets, Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan (R-WI), responding by saying, “Obviously I don’t see that as an appropriate comment. What we’re trying to do around here is improve the tone, the civility of the debate. And this obviously doesn’t help do that” (Diaz 2017).

On Twitter, other Republicans added their disapproval. Ben Sasse (R-NE), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Lynn Jenkins (R-KS) all condemned the president’s speech, however, none of their tweets mentioned the president’s Twitter handle. Other Republicans, like Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Susan Collins (R-ME) indirectly criticized the president’s tweets (ibid.).

In sum, although Trump’s administration and Party were set to move forward on immigration issues, Republicans were forced to answer questions from the media about the president’s comments on Twitter, and address their constituents’ concerns over whether such language is appropriate. While Republicans could have ignored the comments, neglecting to condemn the remarks could be construed as being complicit, demonstrating how Trump’s tweets distract from his party’s legislative agenda, and derail a focus on substantive issues for days at a time.

3.2 Muddying the Agenda: The DACA Tweets

In the fall of 2017, Trump’s use of Twitter contributed to widespread confusion and criticism surrounding the federal program Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), hindering Trump’s own Justice Department. At a press conference on September 5th, 2017, sitting Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, announced that the Trump administration would be ending the Obama era policy on the enforcement of undocumented immigrants. In the announcement, Sessions explained that the policy would be phased out in around 6 months (by March 2018). However, just hours later, Trump sent off a tweet that would call into question this six-month deadline, and his White House’s commitment to dismantling DACA, leading to confusion over the administration’s plans, and around 800,000 affected individuals unsure of their fate.

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals was enacted under President Obama in 2012 by a memorandum from Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano. Under DACA, childrenFootnote 3 who immigrated illegally to America with their families are given the right to live, study, and work in the U.S. Around 800,000 individuals are beneficiaries of DACA.

Obama’s decision to instate DACA in 2012 was due to longstanding Congressional gridlock on immigration reform; seeing a need for action, Obama and his administration elected to instigate policy by executive decree.Footnote 4 When DACA was announced in 2012, there was some pushback from conservative commentators that this action signaled executive overreach, and was potentially legally dubious, however no congressional action was ever taken to nullify the memorandum, and over time the program grew in popularity. According to a Pew Research poll administered in December 2016, three-quarters of Americans agreed that children who were brought to the US illegally should be allowed to stay in the country (Bump 2017). Moreover, according to the American National Election Studies survey, also from 2016, two-thirds of Trump voters supported DACA (ibid.).

Despite its modest popularity, Trump campaigned against DACA while running for president; “Donald Trump’s 10 Point Plan to Put America First” asserted that Trump would

Immediately terminate President Obama’s two illegal executive amnesties. All immigration laws will be enforced – we will triple the number of ICE agents. Anyone who enters the U.S. illegally is subject to deportation. That is what it means to have laws and to have a country.Footnote 5

In the 10 Point Plan, his campaign refers to “two illegal executive amnesties;” in addition to DACA, this point referred to DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of American and Lawful Permanent Residents), which never went into effect.

Given Trump’s stated policy goals during his campaign, the announcement to end DACA in September of 2017 should have been expected. However, while the official position of his campaign was to end DACA, following his election in November Trump somewhat walked back this hardline on this issue in several interviews (Joshi 2017). Yet, Sessions’ announcement in September seemed to signal that Trump and his administration had come to an agreement on how to proceed on DACA. But just a few hours after Sessions’ announcement that DACA would be coming to an end in 6 months time, Trump went to Twitter to equivocate publicly on this decision:

Congress now has 6 months to legalize DACA (something the Obama Administration was unable to do). If they can’t, I will revisit this issue! (September 5, 2017, 7:38pm).

Despite his administration’s announcement of their plan for DACA, the tweet sent out later that day implied that the president planned to revisit the issue if Congress did not find a legislative solution before the 6 month time table outlined by Sessions, “effectively undermining the deadline his own administration set.” Further muddying the water, on September 7th, Trump tweeted:

For all of those (DACA) that are concerned about your status during the 6 month period, you have nothing to worry about – No action! (September 7, 2017, 8:42am).

Here, Trump issued reassurance to DACA recipients, again offering a contrast to the official position of his administration as laid out by his own Justice Department. Reportedly, this sentiment was inspired by a conversation he had with former Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi (CA-D) (ibid). Trump’s seeming concessions on DACA, especially if inspired by Democrats, infuriated conservative commentators, like Laura Ingraham, and Ann Coulter, as well as fellow Republican legislators (Gonyea 2017; Sinclair 2017). Yet, as speculated, Pelosi and fellow Democrats may have just been reinforcing a position Trump had already considered, given a few public interviews, where he expressed sympathy for younger children impacted by their parents’ decision to immigrate illegally (ibid., Joshi 2017). While historically, presidents have had to make tough policy decisions that conflict with their own personal judgment, it is rare for those presidents to make public their disagreements, once a formal administrative position has been taken up. However, Trump’s decision to continue to use Twitter for his personal musings, and on the fly opinions opens the door for just such an occasion, as the battle over positioning on DACA demonstrates.

3.3 Alienating Partners: The Mitch McConnell Tweets

Trump has also used Twitter to alienated members of his own party, in an attempt to displace blame and exculpate his own administration. For example, in July 2017, after Senate Republican’s failed to pass their “skinny repeal” healthcare plan, Trump used Twitter to blame those Republicans who voted against the bill, as well as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, whom he eventually credited with the bill’s failure in no uncertain terms, after McConnell made a statement that attempted to shift some of the blame from Congress to the President.

On May 4, 2017, House Republicans passed their own version of a healthcare plan known as the American Health Care Act. Following the passage, President Trump and Republican House members met in the White House Rose Garden for a celebration and photo op to commemorate the success. The celebration was viewed by many as premature, because a Senate bill had yet to be proposed.

However, within hours, Republicans in the Senate announced their plan to write their own bill, and less than a week later Majority Leader McConnell selected 13 Republicans to write the Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA). After several false starts, and failed amendments from dissatisfied Republicans, McConnell settled on the skinny repeal bill (also know as the Health Care Freedom Act), which was released on July 27; the bill was just 8 pages long. Earlier in the day, President Trump tweeted out some encouraging words, in anticipation of a vote:

Come on Republican Senators, you can do it on Healthcare. After 7 years, this is your chance to shine! Don’t let the American people down (July 27, 2017, 6:24am).

That evening, a little before 10pm, Trump again issued some encouragement:

Go Republican Senators, Go! Get there after waiting for 7 years. Give America great healthcare! (July 27, 2017, 9:43pm)

Here, Trump’s tweets maintain that the burden to pass the bill is on the Senate, and not his administration, by directing his message to “Republican Senators.”

After the bill was released, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell moved quickly to pass it. Given the slim GOP majority in the Senate (52–48), Republicans would need support from all but two members, and even then it would require Vice President Mike Pence to break the tie. However, it is widely assumed that Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell thought he had the votes to pass the bill, since he called for the vote late into the evening on July 27th.

At around 1am, the roll call voting began, and reports claimed that Vice President Pence was on his way to cast the tiebreaking vote, given that Senators Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) and Susan Collins (R-ME) were expected to (and did) vote no. However, when the roll call announced Senator John McCain’s name (R-AZ), he did not announce his vote, and the roll call continued. But minutes later, at 1:24am, McCain walked up to the roll call desk, stretched out his arm, and signaled thumbs down. An audible gasp emerged from the chamber, as McConnell stood stoic, glaring, knowing that the bill had failed.

If there was any uncertainty as to whether or not the president was awake to watch the vote, this was quickly dismissed, because at 1:25am President Trump tweeted:

3 Republicans and 48 Democrats let the American people down. As I said from the beginning, let ObamaCare implode, then deal. Watch! (July 28, 2017, 1:25am)

Here, Trump takes no responsibility for the failed vote, and points out that three Republicans were responsible for the failure. On Twitter the next morning, the blame game continued, only this time Trump blamed the Senate filibuster:

If Republicans are going to pass great future legislation in the Senate, they must immediately go to a 51 vote majority, not senseless 60 (July 28, 2017, 8:46am)

…Even though parts of healthcare could pass at 51, some really good things need 60. So many great future bills & budgets need 60 votes…. (July 28, 2017, 9:00am)

In these two consecutive tweets, Trump places blame on the Senate rules, instead of members of his own party. Yet, a couple of days later, on July 29th, Trump more directly implicated Majority Leader McConnell, by calling on McConnell to dismantle the filibuster:

The very outdated filibuster rule must go. Budget reconciliation is killing R’s in Senate. Mitch M, go to 51 Votes NOW and WIN. IT’S TIME! (July 29, 2017, 6:28am)

In this tweet, Trump did not blame McConnell for the bill’s failure, but instead for the rule that likely led to its failure. However, about week later, this would change, and Trump would target McConnell directly for the bill’s failure.

What would lead the president to target McConnell directly? More than likely it was a response to some comments McConnell made in early August to a Rotary Group in Kentucky. In his remarks, McConnell defended congress and the unsuccessful vote by reminding the audience that legislation takes time. McConnell blamed the president for unrealistic expectations, noting that “Our new president, of course, has not been in this line of work before…” and “I think he had excessive expectations about how quickly things happen in the democratic process” (Rogin 2017). Clearly reacting to these remarks, about a day later, Trump tweeted:

Senator Mitch McConnell said I had ‘excessive expectations,’ but I don’t think so. After 7 years of hearing Repeal & Replace, why not done? (August 9, 2017, 1:14pm)

The piling on continued into the week:

Can you believe that Mitch McConnell, who has screamed Repeal & Replace for 7 years, couldn’t get it done. Must Repeal & Replace ObamaCare! (August 10, 2017, 5:54am)

Mitch, get back to work and put Repeal & Replace, Tax Reform & Cuts and a great Infrastructure Bill on my desk for signing. You can do it! (August 10, 2017, 11:40am)

This particular feud culminated with Trump retweeting Fox and Friends, a daily Fox news program, that speculated openly whether McConnell should step down as Majority Leader:

RT @foxandfriends: Trump fires new warning shot at McConnell, leaves door open on whether he should step down. https://t.co/tJIRc0usWl (August 11, 2017, 6:12am)

This scenario demonstrates how Trump uses Twitter to get ahead of a story, and to remove himself from any blame. It also demonstrates that Trump is unafraid to go after members of his own party, especially when those members target his own political competence. Although past presidents have been known to feud with members of their own party, Trump’s Twitter account makes these feuds public, making intraparty fissures difficult to deny.

3.4 Derailing Goals: The Travel Ban Tweets

Trump’s tweets have also directly thwarted his administrations’ expressed policy goals. On January 27th, less than a week after his inauguration, President Trump signed Executive Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” The executive order directed the Department of Homeland Security to limit the entry of citizens from seven predominantly Muslim countries (Libya, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) into the US, in order to protect US national security interests.

The response to the order was overwhelming. Individual citizens rushed to the airports to protest the decision; numerous members of both parties of Congress publicly condemned the order, and several Democrats submitted bills that would officially nullify the order’s effect. However, the most robust response was from the courts, where Trump’s own words from Twitter would be used against him and contributed to a federal court’s decision that would delay the order’s effect.

Less than a week after Trump signed the initial order, a judge in the 9th District Court ruled a temporary suspension of the order. Trump reacted by taking to Twitter to attack the judge over the course of two days, and also draw into question the legal authority of the judicial branch in general:

The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned! (February 4, 2017, 8:12am)

What is our country coming to when a judge can halt a Homeland Security travel ban and anyone, even with bad intentions, can come into U.S.? (February 4, 2017, 3:44 pm)

Because the ban was lifted by a judge, many very bad and dangerous people may be pouring into our country. A terrible decision (February 4, 2017, 4:44 pm)

The judge opens up our country to potential terrorists and others that do not have our best interests at heart. Bad people are very happy! (February 4, 2017, 7:48 pm)

Just cannot believe a judge would put our country in such peril. If something happens blame him and court system. People pouring in. Bad! (February 5, 2017, 3:39 pm)

As Trump reacted on Twitter, the Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, which agreed to hear the case. However, the three-judge-panel ruled against DOJ on February 9th. This February 9th denial provoked the now widely recognized (and mocked) Trump tweet,

SEE YOU IN COURT, THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION IS AT STAKE! (February 9, 2017, 6:35pm)

In addition to this tweet, he also tweeted that the decision was “disgraceful,” and said that the legal system is “broken.”

According to legal experts, Trump’s tweets were a deciding factor in the court’s February 9th ruling. However, the court’s majority opinion did not reference a specific tweet, or Trump’s Twitter account; instead, the court merely noted that “[T]he states have offered evidence of numerous statements by the President about his intent to implement a ‘Muslim ban’ as well as evidence they claim suggests that the Executive Order was intended to be that ban…” (p. 25), referring to evidence that Trump intended to discriminate, supplied by plaintiffs in the case.

More evidence that judges were aware of Trump’s tweets surfaced a few days later, when a DOJ attorney again appeared before a 9th circuit judge to ask for a postponement. The judge responded by saying, “Counsel, I’m a little surprised since the President said he wanted to ‘see you in court’” (de Vogue 2017). The judge’s comments lifted any suspicion as to whether Trump’s tweets were affecting the executive order in court.

Recognizing the faults in the initial executive order, the Trump White House spent the next month drafting a new order, Executive Order 13780, by the same name that the President signed on March 6, 2017. Unlike the first order, 13780 removed language that could allow for preferential treatment of Christians from the banned countries, which the courts wrote violated both current statute and the Constitution. The order also removed Iraq from the list of banned countries. However, similar to the first order, it was met by criticism, and quickly challenged in court. Again, the challenges drew in evidence outside of the specific language of the order, which included Trump’s Twitter record.

After multiple judges halted the order from going into effect, the order again ended up being argued in the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. And this time, the opinion, published June 12th, cited a specific tweet from Trump, that supported the argument that the order discriminates on the basis of nationality:

That’s right, we need a TRAVEL BAN for certain DANGEROUS countries, not some politically correct term that won’t help us protect our people! (June 5, 2017, 6:20pm).

From the decision by 9th circuit mid-June:

Indeed, the President recently confirmed his assessment that it is the “countries” that are inherently dangerous, rather than the 180 million individual nationals of those countries who are barred from entry under the President’s ‘travel ban.’

The decision went on to reference Trump’s Press Secretary at the time, Sean Spicer, who publicly stated that Trump considers his tweets to be official statements of the President of the United States.

The choice by a federal court to cite a tweet from the president drew a lot of attention, with many of the stories announcing the ruling referencing the role of his Twitter account in the headline. Moreover, this decision has set a precedent, going forward, that will affect not only the Trump administration, but possibly other cases unrelated to the White House troubles. However, it is possible that the Supreme Court, which has yet to hear arguments on the executive order, will not consider external statements, or Trump’s tweets. But for the time being, Trump’s own words on Twitter have immobilized his agenda on this issue.

4 Conclusion

As political scientist and media scholar Bruce Bimber argues, “the digital media environment should be understood as a change in the context for action… this changed context is relevant to behavior because it expands opportunities for action” (Bimber 2017, p. 20). While decades of scholarship exist on presidential communications in particular, new theories need to account for how the social media context enables new tools for strategic communication, and when these tools will be used, and to what effect, and on whom. The relationship between Trump’s tweets and external phenomena, like support for his policies, or his overall approval rating, is receiving more attention by academics, but this scholarship is in the early stages of development. Here, we attempt to broaden the theoretical scope of these inquiries to consider how communication can backfire, and the various ways the effects can be measured.

Taken together, the four examples discussed in this essay show a range of ways that social media use did not advance but rather undermined the strategic message and interests of a single case, the early months of Donald J. Trump’s presidency. By focusing on the counter-productive consequences of these examples, we hope to broaden the conversation in the strategic communications arena to include more than the professional equivalent of how-to manuals and analyses of what factors increase prospects for success and when. By understanding the roots of strategic communications failure and their corresponding consequences, we learn not just how political elites use these techniques but also the dangers inherent in messaging. Future scholars should continue to explore these dimensions while building a bridge between examinations of both positive and negative effects of strategic communications and leadership.