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Douglass C. North und die Institutionenökonomik informaler Regeln

  • Michael SchmidEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Wirtschaft + Gesellschaft book series (WUG)

Zusammenfassung

Im Zentrum der Forschungen von Douglass North stand die Frage, unter welchen institutionellen Bedingungen sich anpassungsfähige, freiheitlich organisierte, dem „Reichtum der Nationen“ förderliche Gesellschaften ausbilden mochten. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht einen Teilaspekt dieser Fragestellung, indem sie North Überlegungen zur Entstehung und Wirkung „informeller Institutionen“ rekonstruiert. North’s Ansinnen, zur Beantwortung seiner Frage die fachspezifischen Eigenheiten unterschiedlicher Disziplinen zu ignorieren, wird eingehend gewürdigt, aber auch die mangelnde Reichweite seiner Erklärungsmodelle kritisiert.

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© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität der Bundeswehr MünchenNeubibergDeutschland

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