Ethics of Beliefs

Abstract

This paper deals with the concept of positive learning (PL). The main goal is to provide a working definition of PL on which further refinements and extensions can be based. First, I formulate a list of desiderata for a definition of PL: I argue that a working definition of PL should (i) make the involved epistemic norms explicit, (ii) be flexible, and (iii) be empirically tractable. After that, I argue that a working definition of PL should focus on three basic epistemic norms (which I call Evidentialism, Degrees of Plausibility, and Non-Arbitrary Updates). Drawing on work on the ethics of belief and Bayesian inference, I highlight theoretical and empirical challenges that already follow from such basic assumptions. Finally, I formulate a working definition of PL based on the three epistemic norms and show that it fulfills the desiderata given above. Furthermore, I also provide a tentative agenda for future research that seeks to develop the notion of PL in various ways that are relevant to PLATO in general, and to a “practical philosophy of mind” in particular.