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Der Aufstieg des Südens: Implikationen für globale Herrschaft im 21. Jahrhundert

Chapter

Zusammenfassung

Der Aufstieg von „Emerging Powers“, also Schwellenländern, die insbesondere durch ihr Wirtschaftswachstum eine größere Rolle in der globalen Ordnung spielen sollten, verdient es, herrschaftsanalytisch betrachtet zu werden. Die Vermutung liegt nahe, dass Länder wie China, Indien oder Brasilien durch ihre gewachsene Bedeutung anders als noch in den 1960er Jahren ihren Widerstand gegen die herrschende Weltwirtschaftsordnung viel wirkmächtiger ausüben können. Um zu überprüfen, wie stichhaltig diese Vermutung ist, wird auf drei prominente Analysestränge zur Herrschaft in der globalen politischen Ökonomie zurückgegriffen: Herrschaft als Hegemonie, als Klassenherrschaft und als Herrschaft durch Institutionen. Wir stellen fest, dass keine dieser drei Perspektiven erlaubt, von gestiegenem Widerstand des Südens zu sprechen. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass das Herrschaftsverhältnis zwischen Nord und Süd und der Widerstand dagegen mit anderen Mitteln analysiert werden muss.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Goethe Universität FrankfurtFrankfurtDeutschland

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