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Die ökonomische Kritik des Rechts

Der Fall der Chicagoer „Kartell-Revolution“

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Dispositiv und Ökonomie

Part of the book series: Interdisziplinäre Diskursforschung ((IDF))

Zusammenfassung

Der „Law andeconomics“-Ansatz entstand an der University of Chicago in den 1940er und 1950er Jahren um die zentrale Figur von Ronald Coase. Diese wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Bewegung ist eine Manifestation des neoliberalen Projekts, das darin besteht die neoklassische Wirtschaftstheorie auf die Souveränität des Staates zu beziehen. In den 1970er und 1980er Jahren revolutionierten der Law andeconomics-Ansatz die Anwendung der Wettbewerbsgesetze in den USA. Dieser Einfluss kamallerdings nicht durch eine Veränderung des wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Mainstreams zustande, sondern indem die Rechtsexperten überzeugt wurden, den inhärenten „Unsinn“ ihrer eigenen normativen Annahmen anzuerkennen. Die sogenannte „Chicago anti-trust revolution” ist daher eine symptomatische Entwicklung wie sie Michel Foucault für den Neoliberalismus als kennzeichnend aufgefasst hat.

Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Ronald Hartz.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. London, Großbritannien

    William Davies

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universität Luzern, Luzern, Switzerland

    Rainer Diaz-Bone

  2. TU Chemnitz, Chemnitz, Germany

    Ronald Hartz

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Davies, W. (2017). Die ökonomische Kritik des Rechts. In: Diaz-Bone, R., Hartz, R. (eds) Dispositiv und Ökonomie. Interdisziplinäre Diskursforschung. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-15842-2_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-15842-2_9

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