Abstract
I reviewed an investor coordination game, as analyzed in Morris and Shin (2004), and added a biased rating. When observing a positive bias, investors know that the signal is sugarcoated and that the underlying state is actually worse. Hence, investors adjust their beliefs by subtracting the bias. With lower conditional expectations more investors foreclose raising the default point
Chapter PDF
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ernstberger, P. (2016). Conclusion. In: Crisis, Debt, and Default. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13231-6_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-13231-6_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-13230-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-658-13231-6
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)