Abstract
States often incorporate agents without formal ties to state institutions into their coercive apparatus. Blurring the already tenuous boundary between state and nonstate violence allows states to carry out illicit and covert actions. Accordingly, the existing literature identifies plausible deniability as a leading explanation for why states use armed proxies. However, states sometimes deliberately make public their relationship with violent nonstate actors. This chapter tackles why states outsource violence overtly by addressing an empirical puzzle: Russia’s partnership with rebels and criminals during the Second Chechen War (1999–2002), but not during the first (1994–1996). It shows that the variation in the two wars stems from the disparity in public support and the military competence of the regular forces. When public opinion strongly supported the military campaign and the regular forces were militarily capable, the Russian state outsourced violence overtly. The public confidence in the war’s rightfulness and the military’s aptitude muted the stigma associated with the state’s reliance on “unsavory” characters. However, when public opinion was against the war and the regular forces were incompetent, overt reliance on proxies would have made the state appear even weaker and more desperate, thereby undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian public.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
I would like to thank Katherine E. Graney for her insight on this issue.
- 2.
Over which the government seized control in 2000.
- 3.
I would like to thank John Schreuer for his research assistance on the kadyrovtsy forces.
References
Akhmadov, I., & Lanskoy, M. (2010). The Chechen struggle: Independence won and lost. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Alenova, O., & Musa Muradov, M. (1999). The efficiency of Gantamirov’s regiment has been tested in combat. Kommersant Daily, p. 3.
Berres, L. (1999). Russia’s first guerrilla. Defence & Security.
Bowker, M. (2005). Western views of the Chechen conflict. In R. Sakwa (Ed.), Chechnya: From past to future. London: Anthem Press.
Campbell, B. B., & Brenner, A. D. (2002). Death squads in global perspective: Murder with deniability. New York: Pelgrave Macmillan.
Colton, T. J. (2008). Yeltsin: A life. New York: Basic Books.
Eke, S. (2007). Yeltsin’s Chechen nightmare. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6588221.stm. Accessed 28 Oct 2015.
Federals unlikely to storm Grozny, warlords ready to pay anything for escape. (1999). Military News Agency.
Findley, M. G., Piazza, J. A., & Young, J. K. (2012). Games rivals play: Terrorism in international rivalries. Journal of Politics, 74(1), 235–248.
Gakaev, D. (2005). Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya. In R. Sakwa (Ed.), Chechnya: From past to future. London: Anthem Press.
Galeotti, M. (2015). Could Kadyrov replace Putin? Moscow Times.
Golotyuk, Y. (1994). On the eve: Bad peace before a good quarrel. Current Digest of the Russian Press, 46(31).
Gukasyan, L. (1999). Russia-Chechnya-Voluntee. Itar-Tass Weekly News.
Human Rights Center Memorial. (2006). The Chechen Republic: Consequences of ‘Chechenization’ of the Conflict. http://www.memo.ru/eng/memhrc/texts/6chechen.shtml. Accessed 19 March 2013.
Lieven, A. (1999). Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian power. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lieven, A. (2008). Gracious Grozny. National interest. http://nationalinterest.org/article/gracious-grozny-2865. Accessed 4 April 2013.
McMahon, C. (1999). Chechen war makes for strange alliance. Chicago Tribune. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-12-28/news/9912280132_1_russian-forces-russian-troops-bislan-gantamirov. Accessed 15 April 2015.
Muradov, M. (1999). The Guerrilla fighters are going to withdraw from Grozny. Kommersant Daily, p. 3.
Nemtsova, A. (2013). The Chechen boss. Foreign policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/01/the_chechen_boss. Accessed March 29 2015.
Oliker, O. (2001). Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994–2000: Lessons from urban combat. Santa Monica: Arroyo Center, RAND.
Ostrovsky, S. (2004). Kadyrov Jr. flexes his muscles in Chechnya. Moscow Times.
Pain, E. (2005). The Chechen War in the context of contemporary Russian politics. In R. Sakwa (Ed.), Chechnya: From past to future. London: Anthem Press..
Politkovskaya, A. (2003). A small corner of hell: Dispatches from Chechnya. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ramazanov, A., & Stepenin, M. (1999). Feds begin to launch assault against Chechen capital. Kommersant Daily, p. 1.
Russia’s No. 1 guerrilla-Yeltsin pardons Beslan Gantemirov-He might be useful. (1999). Current Digest of the Russian Press, 51(45).
Russia-Chechnya. (1999). Itar-Tass Weekly News.
Russia-Chechnya-Grozny. (1999). Itar-Tass Weekly News.
Russia-Chechnya-New-Man. (1999). Itar-Tass Weekly News.
Russia-Press-Review. (1999). Itar-Tass Weekly News.
Sakwa, R. (2005). Introduction: Why Chechnya? In R. Sakwa (Ed.), Chechnya: From past to future. London: Anthem Press.
Saradzhyan, S. (2008). Chechnya vow cast a long shadow. Moscow Times.
Schaefer, R. W., & Doohovskoy, A. (2013). War in the Caucasus: Moving the Russian military into the twenty-first century. In R. B. Ware, The fire from below: How the Caucasus shaped Russia. London: Bloomsbury.
Seely, R. (2001). Russo-Chechen conflict, 1800–2000: A deadly embrace. London: Frank Cass.
Shuster, S. (2011). How the war on terrorism did Russia a favor. Time.
Souleimanov, E. (2006). Russian Chechnya policy: “Chechenization” turning into “Kadyrovization”? Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 8(11) 3–5.
Souleimanov, E. (2015). An ethnography of counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s policy of Chechenization. Post-Soviet Affairs, 31(2), 91–114..
Thomas, T. L. (1999). The Battle of Grozny: Deadly classroom for urban combat. Parameter, 87–102. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/battle.htm. Accessed 1 April 2013.
Tishkov, V. (2004). Chechnya: Life in a war-torn society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Trenin, D. V., & Malashenko, A. V. (2004). Russia’s restless frontier: The Chechnya factor in post-Soviet Russia. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
VCIOM. (1999–2002). Slide 142: How do you assess the actions of Russian forces in Chechnya? http://www.russiavotes.org/admin/single_slide_display.php?sld=144. Accessed 14 April 2015.
VCIOM. (1999). Slide 144: How do you assess the actions of Russian forces in Chechnya? http://www.russiavotes.org/admin/single_slide_display.php?sld=144. Accessed 14 April 2015.
VCIOM. (2000). Slide 229: If the West applies severe economic sanctions against Russia. http://www.russiavotes.org/admin/single_slide_display.php?sld=229. Accessed 14 April 2015.
VCIOM. (2001). Slide 283: Do you think the “cleansings” which Russian soldiers carry out in various districts of Chechnya are necessary or justified? http://www.russiavotes.org/admin/single_slide_display.php?sld=283. Accessed 14 April 2015.
Yambao, R. (2003). Putin and Chechnya: A pre-disposition towards a diversionary theory of war. http://online.sfsu.edu/andrei/RusFSU/747sampleYamboo.htm#_ftn35. Accessed 12 April 2015.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Biberman, Y. (2016). Violence by Proxy: State-Sponsored Rebels and Criminals in Chechnya. In: Koch, B. (eds) State Terror, State Violence. Staat – Souveränität – Nation. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-11181-6_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-11181-6_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer VS, Wiesbaden
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-11180-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-658-11181-6
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)