Abstract
Competitive elections in authoritarian regimes raise two puzzles. Firstly, why they are installed and secondly, whether they have an effect on political outcomes. If pressure for political reforms is overwhelming, then why is there only a transition to a competitive authoritarian regime instead of a full democracy? On the other hand, if authoritarian multiparty elections are merely window-dressings, does electoral competition even have a domestic or international influence? The understanding that elections do not matter hinges on the idea that the electoral process under authoritarianism is neither free nor fair. Moreover, it is difficult to observe when such elections are binding. Institutions or the institutionalized distribution of power as in a multiparty legislature are often thought to be no constraint on actors’ behavior in authoritarian regimes.
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© 2015 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
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Michalik, S. (2015). Conclusion. In: Multiparty Elections in Authoritarian Regimes. Studien zur Neuen Politischen Ökonomie. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-09511-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-09511-6_7
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Online ISBN: 978-3-658-09511-6
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