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Hardware Intrinsic Security to Protect Value in the Mobile Market

  • Vincent van der Leest
  • Roel Maes
  • Geert-Jan Schrijen
  • Pim Tuyls
Conference paper

Abstract

More and more mobile device manufacturers are recognizing the importance of security for their devices in order to protect valuable information of their customers. However, the security of many mobile devices currently does not suffice to protect against modern sophisticated attackers. This paper will go into detail on how these devices can be secured at the hardware level, to ensure that the data of mobile users can be protected against these skilled attackers. For strong protection anchored in hardware, this paper describes the concept of Hardware Intrinsic Security (HIS) and its security benefits for the mobile market. Using HIS technology a root of trust can be created in silicon, which is based on unique physical characteristics of the chips inside mobile devices. These characteristics can be thought of as the electronic fingerprint of a device, a technique also referred to as Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). A PUF is a basic building block for extracting this electronic fingerprint, but it does not provide a security solution by itself. In order to use a PUF in a security product or solution, it must be deployed in a controlled and secure way. This paper describes an extensively tested way of working for designing and implementing an electronic fingerprint, which is derived from these physical characteristics, into the systems required for providing strong security solutions on mobile devices.

Keywords

Mobile Device Smart Card Trusted Platform Module Side Channel Attack SRAM Cell 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vincent van der Leest
    • 1
  • Roel Maes
    • 1
  • Geert-Jan Schrijen
    • 1
  • Pim Tuyls
    • 1
  1. 1.EindhovenNiederlande

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