Möglichkeiten für Reformen

  • Marcus Matthias Keupp


Grundsätzlich kann jedes ökonomische System auf zwei Arten reformiert werden: Durch Veränderungen innerhalb des Institutionenbestandes oder durch dessen Ablösung (Buchanan und Tullock 1962; Buchanan 1990). Eine militärische Organisation kann daher versuchen, Reformen innerhalb des planwirtschaftlichen Systems umzusetzen, oder dieses System zugunsten eines alternativen Systems aufgeben. Innerhalb des planwirtschaftlichen Systems sind Reformen jedoch nur begrenzt möglich.


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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marcus Matthias Keupp
    • 1
  1. 1.Militärakademie an der ETH ZürichZürichSchweiz

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