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Militärökonomie pp 23–64Cite as

Institutionen

Corruptissima re publica plurimae leges

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Zusammenfassung

Im Zeitalter der Nationalstaaten ist die Gründung eines Militärs ein politischer Akt. Anders als eine Unternehmung wird es nicht gegründet, um eine sich bietende Gelegenheit zur Gewinnerzielung auszunutzen, sondern weil die politischen Entscheidungsträger des Staates die Errichtung einer militärischen Organisation an sich wollen. Unabhängig von deren konkreten Aufträgen oder Fähigkeiten ist daher ein politischer Wille erforderlich, der das Militär in diesem grundsätzlichen Sinne legitimiert. Ohne ihn hört die militärische Organisation auf zu bestehen.

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  1. Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich, 8903, Zürich, Schweiz

    Marcus Matthias Keupp

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  1. Marcus Matthias Keupp
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Keupp, M.M. (2019). Institutionen. In: Militärökonomie. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-06147-0_2

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