Corruptissima re publica plurimae leges
  • Marcus Matthias Keupp


Im Zeitalter der Nationalstaaten ist die Gründung eines Militärs ein politischer Akt. Anders als eine Unternehmung wird es nicht gegründet, um eine sich bietende Gelegenheit zur Gewinnerzielung auszunutzen, sondern weil die politischen Entscheidungsträger des Staates die Errichtung einer militärischen Organisation an sich wollen. Unabhängig von deren konkreten Aufträgen oder Fähigkeiten ist daher ein politischer Wille erforderlich, der das Militär in diesem grundsätzlichen Sinne legitimiert. Ohne ihn hört die militärische Organisation auf zu bestehen.


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© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marcus Matthias Keupp
    • 1
  1. 1.Militärakademie an der ETH ZürichZürichSchweiz

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