Clientelist corruption networks: conceptual and empirical approaches

  • Wolfgang Muno

Abstract

Corruption is widespread all over the world. It is seen as a serious problem for wealth, equality, democracy and development. In many countries, corruption is not a deviant behaviour but the norm, generally practised by actors; hence corruption is an informal institution. Despite this, a consensual definition of corruption is nowhere in sight. One way of approaching corruption might be to study forms of corruption. A form or variant often mentioned is corruption networks, or clientelism. In this paper, clientelism is analysed in order to proceed further towards an understanding of corruption. With this perspective, corruption is not seen as a deviant behaviour but the social embeddedness of corruption is better understood. First, concepts and definitions of corruption and clientelism are discussed, highlighting core characteristics and analysing the relationship. Second, different approaches of studying and measuring clientelism are introduced’interpretative, ethnographic field studies, the use of proxies, surveys and expert surveys.

Keywords

Corruption Clientelism Clientelistic networks 

Klientelistische Korruptions-Netzwerke – Konzeptionelle und empirische Ansätze

Zusammenfassung

Korruption als ein global verbreitetes Phänomen wird als schwerwiegendes Problem für Wohlstand, Gleichheit, Demokratie und Entwicklung wahrgenommen. In zahlreichen Staaten gilt Korruption nicht als abweichendes sondern als Norm-konformes Verhalten. Korruption kann dann als informelle Institution betrachtet werden. Dieser Beitrag analysiert eine Spielart von Korruption, den Klientelismus. Er präsentiert Ansätze, um Klientelismus als gesellschaftlich verankerte Interaktionsform differenzierter zu verstehen.

Schlüsselwörter

Korruption Klientelismus Klientelistische Netzwerke 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wolfgang Muno
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceJohannes Gutenberg University MainzMainzGermany

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