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Zusammenfassung

Seit der Finanzkrise gelten die USA als post-hegemonial. Dies ist übertrieben und Folge unscharfer Bestimmungen von Hegemonie. Sicherten die USA im Fordismus kapitalistische Verhältnisse nach Außen militärisch und nach Innen mit Produktivitätspakten ab, so verfechten sie heute die neoliberale Stärkung der Rechte der Kapitaleigner mittels Globalisierung, Finanzialisierung und Militarisierung. Derzeit besteht eine verschränkte Hegemonie des US-Nationalstaats und der emergenten transnationalen Bourgeoisie.

Schlüsselwörter

Hegemonie Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika Transnationale Bourgeoisie Militärische Vormacht Technologische Vormacht 

The Post-hegemonic USA?

Abstract

Many consider the U.S. as post-hegemonic nowadays. This is an exaggeration and results from an imprecise definition of hegemony. During Fordism the U.S. defended capitalist relations militarily abroad and with productivity pacts domestically. Today they pursue a neoliberal strategy of strengthening the rights of property holders via globalization, financialization and militarization. Thus, the current state of hegemony consists of a linkage between the U.S. state and an emerging transnational bourgeoisie.

Keywords

Hegemony United States of America Transnational bourgeoisie Military leadership Technological leadership 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christoph Scherrer
    • 1
  1. 1.Universität KasselKasselDeutschland

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