Advertisement

Neue Märkte, neue Risiken

Empirische Evidenz zum Korruptionsrisiko für den international aktiven Mittelstand
  • Christian Hauser
  • Franz Kronthaler
Part of the ZfB Special Issue book series (ZFB, volume 4/2013)

Zusammenfassung

Basierend auf der Argumentationslogik des verhandlungstheoretischen Ansatzes analysiert der vorliegende Beitrag, (1) wie häufig mittelständische Unternehmen im Ausland mit Korruption konfrontiert werden, (2) wie häufig diese informelle Zahlungen unter der Hand leisten, wenn dies von ihnen gefordert wird, und (3) welche Höhe diese Zahlungen haben. Die Schätzungen erfolgen mittels diverser Regressionsmodelle anhand eines originären Datensatzes international aktiver Schweizer Unternehmen aller Größen und Branchen. Im Gegensatz zur Mehrzahl der existierenden Studien zur Inlandskorruption, zeigen die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Untersuchung, dass die Unternehmensgröße und die Eigentümerstruktur im Fall der Auslandskorruption keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf das Korruptionsrisiko eines Unternehmens haben. Gleichzeitig macht die große Anzahl an Unternehmen, die im Ausland Bestechungsgelder bezahlt, deutlich, dass auch der international tätige Mittelstand von Korruptionsrisiken unmittelbar betroffen ist und entsprechende Präventionsmaßnahmen ergreifen muss.

Schlüsselwörter:

Internationalisierung Korruption Kleine und mittlere Unternehmen (KMU) Verhandlungstheoretischer Ansatz 

New markets, new risks Empirical evidence regarding the corruption risk of SMEs operating abroad

Abstract

Based on the concepts of the bargaining theory this paper analyzes how frequently SMEs are confronted with corruption when operating abroad, how frequently they make informal payments if requested, and how high these informal payments are. We estimate several regression models for a unique data set of internationally active Swiss firms with different sizes and from different industries. In contrast to earlier findings on domestic corruption, the results of this study show that company sizes as well as ownership structure do not have a significant influence on the foreign corruption risk. At the same time, the large number of firms, which make bribery payments abroad, proves that internationally active SMEs are severely affected by corruption risks and need to take precautionary measures.

Keywords:

internationalization corruption small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) bargaining theory 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Literatur

  1. Alemann, U. v.; Kleinfeld, R. (1992): Begriff und Bedeutung politischer Korruption aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht. In: Benz, A.; Seibel, W. . Zwischen Kooperation und Korruption. Abweichendes Verhalten in der Verwaltung. Baden-Baden: Nomos. S. 259–282Google Scholar
  2. Arvas, M.A.; Ata, A.Y. (2011): Determinants of economic corruption: A cross-country data analysis. International Journal of Business and Social Science 2(13). S. 161–169Google Scholar
  3. Aterido, R.; Hallward-Driemeier, M.; Pagé s, C. (2009): Big Constraints to Small Firms’ Growth? Business Environment and Employment Growth across Firms. Policy Research Working Paper 5032. The World BankGoogle Scholar
  4. Ayyagari, M.; Demirguc-Kunt, A.; Maksimovic, V. (2010): Are Innovating Firms Victims or Perpetrators? Tax Evasion, Bribe Payments, and the Role of External Finance in Developing Countries. Policy Research Working Paper 5389. The World BankGoogle Scholar
  5. Bamberger, I.; Evers, M. (1997): Ursachen und Verläufe von Internationalisierungsentscheidungen mittelständischer Unternehmen. In: Macharzina, K.; Oesterle, M. . Handbuch Internationales Management, Grundlagen, Instrumente, Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: Schäffer-Poeschel. S. 103–137CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Banerjee, A.; Hanna, R.; Sendhil, M. (2009): Corruption. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). February. MimeoGoogle Scholar
  7. Bazerman, M.H.; Neale, M.A. (1992): Negotiating rationally. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
  8. Bazerman, M.H.; Lewicki, R.J. (Hrsg.) (1983): Negotiating in Organizations. Beverly Hills: Sage PublicationsGoogle Scholar
  9. Becker, K.; Hauser, C.; Kronthaler, F. (2013): Fostering management education to deter corruption: what do students know about corruption and its legal consequences? Crime, Law and Social Change. 60(2). S. 227–240. DOI 10.1007/s10611-013-9448–8Google Scholar
  10. Bennedsen, M.; Feldmann, S.; Lassen Dreyer, D. (2009): Strong firms lobby, weak firms bribe: A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption. RochesterGoogle Scholar
  11. Berghoff, H.; Rauh, C. (2013): Korruption rechnet sich nicht. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 30. S. 12Google Scholar
  12. Bitzenis, A.; Nito, E. (2005): Obstacles to entrepreneurship in a transition business environment: the case of Albania. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 12(4). S. 564–578CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Cho, D.; Chu, W. (1994): Determinants of Bargaining Power in OEM Negotiations. Industrial Marketing Management 23(4). S. 343–355CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Ciliberti, F.; Pontrandolfo, P.; Scozzi, B. (2008): Investigating corporate social responsibility in supply chains: a SME perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production 16(15). S. 1579–1588Google Scholar
  15. Clarke, G.; Xu, L.C. (2002): Ownership, Competition and Corruption: Bribe Takers versus Bribe PayersGoogle Scholar
  16. Coff, R. (1999): When Competitive Advantage Doesn’ t Lead to Performance: The Resource-Based View and Stakeholder Bargaining Power. Organization Science 10(2). S. 119–133CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Collins, J.; Uhlenbruck, K.; Rodriguez, P. (2009): Why Firms Engage in Corruption: A Top Management Perspective. Journal of Business Ethics 87(1). S. 89–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Daboub, A.; Rasheed, A.; Priem, R.; Gray, D. (1995): Top Management Team Characteristics and corporate Illegal Activity. Academy of Management Review 20(1). S. 138–170Google Scholar
  19. Della Porta, D.; Vannucci, A. (2005): The Governance Mechanism of Corrupt Transactions. The New Institutional Economics of Corruption. New York: RoutledgeGoogle Scholar
  20. Europäische Kommission (2003) Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Official Journal of the European Union L 124. S. 36–41Google Scholar
  21. Fisher, R.; Ury, W.; Patton, B. (1992): Getting to Yes – Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. 2. Auflage. London: Houghton MifflinGoogle Scholar
  22. Fisman, R.; Svensson, J. (2007): Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence. Journal of Development Economics 83(1). S. 63–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Foure, J.; Bé nassy-Qué ré , A.; Fontagné , L. (2010): The Global Economy in 2050. Paris: CEPIIGoogle Scholar
  24. Geiger, I. (2007): Industrielle Verhandlungen. Wiesbaden: Deutscher UniversitätsverlagGoogle Scholar
  25. Gordon, K.; Miyake, M. (2001): Business Approaches to Combating Bribery: A Study of Codes of Conduct. Journal of Business Ethics 34(3). S. 161–174CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Grunert, J.; Norden, L. (2012): Bargaining power and information in SME lending. Small Business Economics 39(2). S. 401–417CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Gujarati, D. (2011): Econometrics by Example. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacmillanGoogle Scholar
  28. Gupta, S.; Davoodi, H.; Alonso-Terme, R. (1998): Does Corruption Impact income Inequality and Poverty? IMF Working Paper. Washington D.C.Google Scholar
  29. Habib, M.; Zurawicki, L. (2002): Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of International Business Studies 33(2). S. 291–307CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Hauser, C. (2006): Außenwirtschaftsförderung für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Eine empirische Analyse auf der Basis der ökonomischen Theorie des Föderalismus. In: Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn : Schriften zur Mittelstandsforschung Nr. 113 NF. Wiesbaden: Gabler VerlagGoogle Scholar
  31. Hauser, C. (2012) Internationales Umfeld. In: Ammann, P.; Lehmann, R.; van den Bergh, S.; Hauser, C. Going International – Konzepte und Methoden zur Erschliessung ausländischer Märkte. Zürich: Versus. S. 17–70Google Scholar
  32. Hollenstein, H. (2005): Determinants of International Activities: Are SMEs Different? Small Business Economics 24(5). S. 431–450CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Holtfreter, K. (2005): Is occupational fraud typical white-collar crime? A comparison of individual and organizational characteristics. Journal of Criminal Justice 33(4). S. 353–365Google Scholar
  34. Johanson, J.; Vahlne, J.E. (1990): The Mechanism of Internationalisation. International Marketing Review 7(4). S. 11–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Johanson, J.; Vahlne, J.E. (2009): The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: From liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of International Business Studies 40(9). S. 411–431CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Kaufmann, D.; Kraay, A.; Mastruzzi, M. (2009): Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008. Policy Research Working Paper 4978. The World BankGoogle Scholar
  37. Knight, G.A. (2001): Entrepreneurship and strategy in the international SME. Journal of International Management 7(3) S. 155–171CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Kouznetsov, A.; Dass, M. (2010): Does Size Matter? A qualitative study into areas of corruption where a firm’ s size influences prospects for distributors of foreign-made goods in Russia. Baltic Journal of Management 5(1). S. 51–67Google Scholar
  39. Lepoutre, J.; Heene, A. (2006): Investigating the Impact of Firm Size on Small Business Social Responsibility: A Critical Review. Journal of Business Ethics 69(3). S. 257–273CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Martin, K.; Cullen, J.; Johnson, J.; Parboteeah, K. (2007): Deciding to Bribe: A Cross-Level Analysis of Firm and Home Country Influences on Bribery Activity. Academy of Management Journal 50(6). S. 1401–1422CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Mauro, P. (1995): Corruption and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(3). S. 681–712.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Mo, P.H. (2001): Corruption and economic growth. Journal of Comparative Economics 29(1). S. 66–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Moosmayer, K. (2012): Compliance. Praxisleitfaden für Unternehmen. 2. Auflage. München: Verlag C.H. BeckGoogle Scholar
  44. Murphy, K.; Shleifer, A.; Vishny, R. (1993): Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth? AEA Papers and Proceedings 83(2). S. 409–414Google Scholar
  45. Muthoo, A. (2000): A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory. World Economics 1(2). S. 145–166Google Scholar
  46. Neugebauer, G. (1978): Grundzüge einer ökonomischen Theorie der Korruption: eine Studie über die Bestechung. Basler sozialökonomische Studien. Zürich: Schulthess Polygraph. VerlagGoogle Scholar
  47. OECD (2008): Components of Integrity: Data and benchmarks for tracking trends in government. OECDGoogle Scholar
  48. Papke, L.E.; Wooldridge, J.M. (1996): Econometric Methods for Fractional Response VariablesGoogle Scholar
  49. with an Application to 401(k) Plan Participation Rates. Journal of Applied Econometrics 11(6). S. 619–632Google Scholar
  50. Pieth, M. (2011): Anti-Korruptions-Compliance. Praxisleitfaden für Unternehmen. 1. Auflage. Zürich/St. Gallen: Dike VerlagGoogle Scholar
  51. Ramessur, K.; Schmidt, J. (2008): Confronting corruption: The business case for an effective anticorruption programme. Pricewaterhouse CoopersGoogle Scholar
  52. Reinikka, R.; Svensson, J. (2002): Measuring and understanding corruption at the micro level. In: Della Porta, D.; Rose-Ackerman, S. Corrupt Exchanges: Empirical Themes in the politics and Political Economy of Corruption. Baden-Baden: Nomos. S. 135–146Google Scholar
  53. Reinikka, R.; Svensson, J. (2006): Using Micro-Surveys to Measure and Explain Corruption. World Development 34(2). S. 359–370CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Renner, E. (2004): Wie lässt sich Korruption wirksam bekämpfen? Empirische Befunde aus der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 73(2). S. 292–300Google Scholar
  55. Rose-Ackerman, S. (2004): Governance and corruption. In Lomborg, B. (Hrsg.), Global crises, Global solutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. S. 301–343Google Scholar
  56. Smarzynska, B.K.; Wei, S. (2000): Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-Level Evidence. Working Paper 7969. National Bureau of Economic ResearchGoogle Scholar
  57. Smarzynska, B.K.; Wei, S. (2002): Corruption and Cross-Border Investment: Firm-Level Evidence. William Davidson Working Paper 494Google Scholar
  58. Svensson, J. (2003): Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1). S. 207–234CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Tanzi, V.; Davoodi, H. (2000): Corruption, Growth and Public Finances. IMF Working Paper No. 116. Washington D.C.Google Scholar
  60. Tekin-Koru, A. (2006): Corruption And The Ownership Composition Of The Multinational Firm At The Time Of Entry: Evidence From Turkey. Journal of Economics and Finance 30(2). S. 251–269CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Transparency International (2011a): Corruption Perceptions Index. Berlin: Transparency InternationalGoogle Scholar
  62. Transparency International (2011b): Bribe Payers Index. Berlin: Transparency International.Google Scholar
  63. Treisman, D. (2000): The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics 76(3). S. 399–457CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  64. UNDP (2008): A Users’ Guide to Measuring Corruption. Oslo: United Nations Development ProgrammeGoogle Scholar
  65. UNIDO; UNODC (2007): Corruption prevention to foster small and medium-sized enterprise development. Wien: UNIDO & UNODCGoogle Scholar
  66. Weber, W.; Kabst, R. (2000): Internationalisierung mittelständischer Unternehmen. Organisationsform und Personalmanagement. In: Gutmann, J.; Kabst, R. Internationalisierung im Mittelstand. Chancen, Risiken, Erfolgsfaktoren. Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag. S. 3–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Yan, A.; Gray, B. (1994): Bargaining Power, Management Control, and Performance in United States-China Joint Ventures: A Comparative Case Study. The Academy of Management Journal 37(6). S. 1478–1517CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Gabler | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian Hauser
    • 1
  • Franz Kronthaler
    • 2
  1. 1.Schweizerischen Institut für Entrepreneurship der Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft HTW ChurChurSchweiz
  2. 2.Zentrum für wirtschaftspolitische Forschung der Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft HTW ChurChurSchweiz

Personalised recommendations