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Das „Heuristics-and-Biasses“-Programm

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Behavioral Economics

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Zusammenfassung

In der klassischen ökonomischen Theorie werden Probleme mit Hilfe der Logik und der elementaren Regeln der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie gelöst. Diesem streng rationalen Ansatz zur Problemlösung stellten Psychologen bereits in den frühen siebziger Jahren die Idee entgegen, dass Menschen aus Entscheidungssituationen nicht mathematische Probleme machen, sondern mentale Abkürzungen bei der Lösung von Problemen nehmen – mittels sogenannter Heuristiken. Dieser Abschnitt stellt die wichtigsten Heuristiken vor und diskutiert sie kritisch; zugleich zeigt er deren Weiterentwicklung zu sogenannten effizienten Heuristiken auf.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Bei einer Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit weiß man nicht, mit welchen Wahrscheinlichkeiten ein Ereignis eintritt; bei einer Entscheidung unter Risiko kennt man zumindest die Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Ein Münzwurf ist also eine Entscheidung mit Risiko (man kennt die Wahrscheinlichkeit für Kopf oder Zahl), eine Wette auf den Ausgang eines Fußballspiels hingegen ist eine Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit, da man keine genauen Informationen über die Wahrscheinlichkeiten des Ausgangs hat.

  2. 2.

    Man bildet aus einer Gesamtmenge mit n = 10 Mitgliedern eine Gruppe von k, wobei die Anordnung, also die Reihenfolge der Mitglieder keine Rolle spielt. Das errechnet man über den Binomial-Koeffizienten.

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    Hanno Beck

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Beck, H. (2014). Das „Heuristics-and-Biasses“-Programm. In: Behavioral Economics. Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-03367-5_2

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