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Das „Heuristics-and-Biasses“-Programm

  • Hanno Beck
Chapter

Zusammenfassung

In der klassischen ökonomischen Theorie werden Probleme mit Hilfe der Logik und der elementaren Regeln der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie gelöst. Diesem streng rationalen Ansatz zur Problemlösung stellten Psychologen bereits in den frühen siebziger Jahren die Idee entgegen, dass Menschen aus Entscheidungssituationen nicht mathematische Probleme machen, sondern mentale Abkürzungen bei der Lösung von Problemen nehmen – mittels sogenannter Heuristiken. Dieser Abschnitt stellt die wichtigsten Heuristiken vor und diskutiert sie kritisch; zugleich zeigt er deren Weiterentwicklung zu sogenannten effizienten Heuristiken auf.

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© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hochschule PforzheimPforzheimDeutschland

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